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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Maritime jurisdiction-End of "Twilight Zone"
Section 3(a) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act' provides:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring on the
navigable waters of the United States ... and if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law.
In Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.' two welders were injured,
one fatally, while performing construction work on unfinished vessels
launched and floating in navigable waters. The injured welder and
the personal representative of the deceased welder claimed benefits
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The awards were allowed by the Deputy Commissioner and affirmed
in the district courts.3 The court of appeals reversed both judgments,4 holding that since compensation for the workers could validly be provided by state law, the language of the Longshoremen's
Act precluded recovery under that statute. The two cases were
heard together on certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court
reversed, two justices dissenting.5 The majority found that Congress had enacted the act in order to provide compensation for all
injuries suffered by employees on navigable waters, regardless of
whether the injury was compensable under a state workmen's compensation law.
The history behind this decision points out the difficult area
upon which the instant decision purports to shed light. Before 1917,
it was held by both state' and federal7 courts that the compensation
144 Stat. §§ 1424, 1426-27, 1429, 1431-32, 1434-46 (1927), as amended,
§§ 901-50 (1958).
33 U.S.C.U.S.
114 (1962).
2370
' These cases are apparently unreported.
'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961); Avondale
Shipyards, Inc. v. Donovan, 293 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1961).
' Justice Stewart and Justice Harlan. Justice Frankfurter did not participate0 in the decision.
Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 AtI. 372 (1915);
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laws of the various states were applicable to all land-based workers,
regardless of the fact that the injury itself might have occurred on
navigable waters. In 1917, however, the Supreme Court in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen8 decided that state compensation acts could
not validly be applied to stevedores unloading vessels on navigable
waters. The application of the state acts to such injuries, said the
Court, would destroy the uniformity of the general maritime law,
and the state acts to that extent were declared invalid. The immediate result of the Jensen decision was that stevedores were deprived
of any sort of compensation if they had the misfortune of being
injured while on the ship, rather than on the dock where their
injuries would be covered by the state compensation statutes. 9 Two
subsequent federal acts' ° purporting to apply the compensation laws
of the various states to workers injured on navigable waters were
struck down as unconstitutional delegations of authority to the
states.': Meanwhile, the Supreme Court, mindful of the harsh effects of Jensen, began to restrict that decision somewhat in holding
that certain types of activities were of a maritime nature, but of local
concern, and that as to them, state workmen's compensation statutes
could constitutionally be applied."2 The leading case in this area
Lindstrom v. Mutual S.S. Co., 132 Minn. 328, 156 N.W. 669 (1916).

See

generally Annot., 25 A.L.R. 1029 (1923).
Riegel v. Higgins, 241 Fed. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1917); Berton v. Tietjen &
Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 Fed. 763 (D.N.J. 1915). See generally Annot., 25
A.L.R. 1029 (1923).
8244 U.S. 205 (1917).
' The House Judiciary Committee on what later became the Longshoremen's Act was treated to a humorous example of this undesirable result in
the statement of an attorney for the International Longshoremen's Association: "A man was coming down a ladder from the deck of the ship "to the
dock. And he was a pretty fat man; and the boat was out about 2 feet from
the dock. And the rope that was holding the ladder broke ... he fell with
his weight between the ship and the dock. His buttocks struck the dock and
his belly struck the ship. Now, he has a sprained shoulder; assuming tfhat the
sprain took place on the way from the deck down to the dock, the compensation commission of New York awarded him compensation for injury to the
buttocks, but not for injury to the shoulder." Hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee on, H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1926).
" Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 19?2, ch.

216, 42 Stat. 634.

"Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S.149 (1920).
" The "local concern" doctrine was first mentioned in Western Fuel Co.
v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), where, although the action was held barred by
the applicable statute of limitations, the Court stated: "The subject is maritime and local in character, and the specified modification of or supplement
to the rule applied to admiralty courts, when following the common law,
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was Grant-Smith-PorterCo. v. Rohde, 3 which held that a worker

performing construction work on an unfinished vessel floating on
navigable waters was engaged in an activity purely local in scope,
and that the application of the Oregon Workmen's Compensation
Act to his injuries would work no prejudice to the uniformity of the
general maritime law.
Although Rohde and like decisions1 4 mitigated the damage
wrought by Jensen as to certain classes of workers, the stevedore
injured on the ship he was unloading was still without a remedy.
This result adversely affected a very substantial number of persons, 5
and there was an appeal from employers and employees alike for
effective relief. Congress, after seeing their two previous attempts
at solving the problem rendered impotent by the Court, took notice
of the constitutional problem involved, and the new attempt was
built around a piece of judicial admonishment in Washington v.
W. C. Dawson & Co. 6 to the effect that uniform federal legislation
should be enacted in order to cover those injuries rendered noncompensable by the Court.' An examination of the various comwill not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general
maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that
law. ...

"

257 U.S. at 242.

- 257 U.S. 469 (1922). In deciding the case, the Court relied heavily on
the dictum set out only a month earlier in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra
note 12.
",See Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 276 U.S. 467
(1928) (fisherman injured while pushing boat off shore into navigable
waters); Millers' Indem. Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926) (diver
sawing off timbers on abandoned launching ways); Sunny Point Packing
Co. v. Faigh, 63 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1933) (watchman stationed on floating
fish trap fastened to shore).
1 Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee on the proposed
Longshoremen's Act indicated that there were approximately 250,000 persons
who would be affected by the act. Hearings before the House Committee
on the Judiciaryon H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926).
16264 U.S. 219 (1924).
17
"Without doubt Congress has power to alter, amend or revise the maritime law by statutes of general application embodying its will and judgment.
This power, we think, would permit enactment of a general employers'
liability law, or general provisions for compensating injured employees; but
it may not be delegated to the several states. The grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction looks to uniformity ... ."

264 U.S. at 227.

The

original draft of the Longshoremen's Act was carefully worded in order
to be in accordance with this dictum. See, e.g., Hearings before a Subcoininittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1926), where the following exchange is recorded: "Mr. Chamberlain.... And in this last decision [referring to the Dawson case], being
pressed on that point, the court says that compensation is possible under
the admiralty power of Congress. So the bill is based on that theory of the
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mittee and subcommittee hearings on the proposed bill shows that
the purpose of Congress was to provide compensation only for those
who were left without a remedy by the decisions of the Supreme
Court, and that as to the others, the states could supply an adequate
remedy."8 The dissent in the principal case quotes the Senate Committee Report: "If longshoremen could avail themselves of the benefits of the State compensation laws, there would be no occasion for
this legislation .

.

. ," 9 One motivating factor giving rise to this

general attitude may well have been the differences in the rate scales
of the Longshoremen's Act and the compensation acts of the states.20
In certain states, the rates were somewhat lower than those under
the federal act.2 Therefore, the locus of the injury might have
made a substantial difference in the compensation payable for a given
injury. This result was patently undesirable, containing a vast
potential for perjured claims, and for policy reasons, it would seem
that situations where one worker could be covered by two acts
should have been kept at a minimum.
At any rate, the bill as it was first introduced appeared to reflect
a desire to leave within state jurisdiction exclusively those marginal
cases which the Court had decided were within the "local concern"
concept. It read in part: "This act shall apply to any employment
performed on a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States, except employment of local concern and of no direct relation to navigation and commerce ....

It was immediately recognized that the latter clause, if left in
court. Senator Overman. This bill is based on that decision. Mr. Chamberlain. It is based on that suggestion. And really there would be no way
possible to take care of the situation otherwise that I know of."
18 See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. 3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926), where an attorney
representing the Longshoremen's Union indicated widespread agreement
among all parties concerned that State law should handle the situation. "But
it [the bill] is designed to give a remedy where the State compensation law
does not protect a man or his family... ." Id. at 25. Discussion before the
House Committee contains language of similar import. See Hearings before
the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
39 (1926).
S.REP. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1926).
20 See Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 9498, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1926), where the reported discussion reflects an uneasiness concerning this part of the bill on the part of a large employers' association.
2 Id. at 51-52.
2 Id. at 2; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary on S.3170, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
19
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its then existing state, would foster much litigation.23 The litigation would, of course, have been avoided entirely by the simple
deletion of the offending clause. The House Committee in redrafting the bill did in fact omit the clause.24 But at some point in the
proceedings, the House Committee changed its collective mind, deciding instead to accept the revision made by the Senate Committee.2" That draft, accepted by both Committees and later by Congress, read substantially as it does today, i.e., that compensation was
payable under the act only if state law could not provide a remedy.2 6
The majority in Calbeck found that the latter change gave rise
to a "reasonable inference" that Congress meant to avoid the potential litigation inherent in the "local concern" exception ;21 that their
true purpose was to "provide compensation for all injuries sustained
by employees on navigable waters whether or not a particular injury
might also have been within the constitutional reach of a state workmen's compensation law,"28 and that the final wording was accepted,
and later passed, in its present form only because of a "parliamentary obstacle" 29 to its further revision. The very fact that Congress,
when faced with an obvious solution to the dilemma of impending litigation, chose instead to use language just as pregnant with potential
lawsuits does not appear to support the majority's opinion that one
of the primary purposes of Congress was to avoid litigation. On
the contrary, it suggests that Congress was unwilling to extend
federal jurisdiction any further than necessity demanded, albeit at
the expense of some legal uncertainty. The dissent offers a more
logical reason for the change in language. Conceivably, the Court
might choose to extend state jurisdiction beyond the bounds of
"local concern"; if so, the final wording of the act would be broad
enough to cover these changes, making the federal law inapplicable
in such cases.30
After the passage of the Longshoremen's Act in 1927, the clause
excluding from federal coverage those injuries compensable under
" See, e.g., Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on
H.R. 9498, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1926).
"H.R. Rep. No. 1767, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1927).
25 There is apparently no record of the deliberations leading to the House
Committee's change in the language of the act.
S. Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926).
370 U.S. at 123.
28
Id. at 117.
29
Id. at 124.
*Old. at 135 n.4.
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state law produced, as expected, rather heavy litigation."' The
"maritime but local" concept continued to lend an air of uncertainty
as to what relief a particular worker was entitled, and in which
court. Each case was decided on its own separate facts, and it became apparent that if an injured employee made a wrong guess as
to the jurisdiction of his case, he might be denied recovery under
either the state or the federal act, due to the relatively short statutes
of limitations common to most workmen's compensation acts.82
This was clearly not the intent of Congress.83 Accordingly, in
Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 4 the Supreme Court held
that where the facts of a particular case were such that counsel
could not accurately predict, in the light of existing case law, the
'proper forum in which to bring action, there would be a presumption that his choice was correct, and in effect recovery would be
allowable in either court. The Court termed the doubtful area the
"twilight zone.""5
After announcing the "twilight zone" doctrine, the Court proceeded to apply it in subsequent cases where, before the existence
of the doctrine, there would have been no question as to jurisdiction. 36
When the principal case came before the court of appeals, 7 the
issue was whether the injury came within a "twilight zone" rendered overly elastic by those decisions. Apparently, neither party
seriously contended that the federal act was applicable to all injuries
suffered on navigable waters. Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit
was of the opinion that the "twilight zone" could not apply, because
under the Rohde case an injury suffered by an employee engaged in
" See, e.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. McManigal, 87 F.2d 332 (2d Cir.
1937); United States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 639 (1933); Puget Sound Nay. Co. v. Marshall, 31 F. Supp. 903
(W.D. Wash. 1940).
" See, e.g., Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936).
" "Such a result defeats the purpose of the federal act, which seeks to give
'to these hard-working men, engaged in a somewhat hazardous employment,
the justice involved in the modern principle of compensation' ....
" Davis v.

Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 254 (1942).
8'317 U.S. 249 (1942).
s"Id. at 256.

"O
See Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 346 U.S. 366 (1953);
Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949) ; Bethlehem Steel Co.
v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874, affirning per curiam Moores v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948). See generally Baer, ADMIRALTY
LAw OF THE SUPREME COURT 75-83 (1963).
'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Calbeck, 293 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1961).
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construction of an unfinished vessel afloat on navigable waters was
clearly compensable under the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation
Act, and thus the claimants could not recover under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act. 8
The majority of the Supreme Court, in reversing the apparently
logical decision of Judge Brown, found that all injuries suffered by
employees on navigable waters were within the act, despite the language of section 3(a) .3 The dissent notes that if the instant
decision be taken at face value, then the problem which gave rise to
the "twilight zone" never existed ;40 certainly, there is now no longer
a need for it. By the judicial deletion of an entire phrase of the
act, the Court has eliminated the uncertainty which marked the
"maritime but local" area, and there is little doubt that this is a
desirable result.4 ' The method by which that result is reached,
however, seems to set an alarming precedent. The Court as late as
1959 had recognized the existence of the "twilight zone" and the
terms of the act which it emasculated in Calbeck ;4' even some of the
cases cited by the majority as being "entirely consistent" with their
conclusion contain much language suggesting just the opposite result.

43

In view of the result reached in the principal case, the Court's
next step may well be to hold injuries on navigable waters not
compensable under state acts under any circumstances. Such a decision would, of course, do violence to a large body of case law,44 but
would be consistent with the basis of the Jensen case, i.e., uniformity
of the general maritime law, and, when considered with Calbeck,
would also point out a clear procedural path where before lay uncertainty: if the injury is sustained on navigable waters, recovery
o370 U.S. at 117.
38Id. at 59.
,oId. at 137.
in the principal case, writes:
the
dissent
"1Justice Stewart, speaking for
"While the result reached today may be a desirable one, it is simply not what
the law provides." Id. at 132.
" Hahn v.Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272 (1959).
" "Congress having expressly kept out of the area in which 'recovery...
may... validly be provided by State law ....'" Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 247 (1941); "Here again, however, Congress made clear
its purpose to permit state compensation protection whenever possible by
making the federal law applicable only 'if recovery... may not validly be
provided by state law.'" Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 317 U.S.
249, 252-53 (1942).
"E.g., Grant-Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); United
States Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 64 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied. 290 U.S. 639
(1933).
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will be under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act; and
if the injury is sustained on land, the state workmen's compensation
proceedings will provide the remedy.
STEPHEN C. COWPER

Early Statutory and Common Law of Divorce in North Carolina
American courts and legislatures have for a century and a half
looked with disfavor on the dissolution of marriage.' In so doing
they have created a fifty-headed hydra of an internecine complexity
unparalled in the law. Here we shall investigate the birth and early
childhood of that great serpent in North Carolina.
At the outset it is well to agree on just what is meant by the
term "divorce." Historically, it has been used to describe four distinct remedies affecting the marital status: (1) divorce a mensa et
thoro, (2) divorce a vinculo matrimonii by legislative act, (3) divorce a vinculo matrimonii by judicial decree, and (4) annulment.
At common law the term "divorce" properly comprehended only
the divorce a mensa et thoro, commonly known as legal separation or
divorce from bed and board, although annulment was often incorrectly termed "absolute divorce." 2 In its modern sense, as a dissolution of a valid existing marriage, "divorce" means a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii by judicial decree8 or legislative act.4 The latter
has become obsolete.
"We reconcile ourselves to what is inevitable. Experience finds pain
1

more tolerable than it was expected to be; and habit makes even fetters light.
Exertion, when known to be useless, is unassayed; though the struggle might
be violent, if by possibility it could be successful. A married couple thus
retrained may become, if not devoted in their affections, at least discreet
partners, striving together for the common good, and steady friends, ready
to perform all offices of kindness required by the other-instead of the dissentient heads of a distracted family, driven by inflamed passions to a
degree of madness not to be satisfied with less than an entire separation,
though it bring disgrace on themselves and their offspring, and deprive the
latter of the greatest earthly advantage, the nurture and admonitions of a
parent." Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535, 542 (1832). Compare the
views of South Carolina and Georgia: "The policy of this State has ever
been against divorces. It is one of her boasts that no divorce has ever been
granted in South Carolina." Hair v. Hair, 31 S.C. Eq. 163, 174 (1858).
"[I]n South Carolina... to her unfading honor, a divorce has not been
granted since the Revolution ...." Head v. Head, 2 Ga. 191, 196 (1847).
2 This convenient dichotomy caused some confusion. See, e.g., Crump v.
Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843).
'Absolute divorce by judicial decree was unknown in England until the
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict. ch. 85. There were a few
instances of such decrees during the early years of the Reformation, but it
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Before 1857 all matrimonial causes in England were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.5 Marriage, being
one of the seven sacraments of the church, was absolutely insoluble
if validly contracted.' The common law knew no absolute divorce.
However, the church could not compel two completely antipathetic
persons to live together in peace. Separation was inevitable. To
protect the husband from spurious heirs born to the wife during
such a separation, and to provide for her support, the ecclesiastical
courts would, for weighty reason, legalize the separation. But the
marriage was not dissolved; in the eyes of God and the law it still
existed.' This legal separation, the divorce a menma et thoro, could
be obtained for two causes: cruelty or adultery.' Basically, this was
the divorce law officially received in North Carolina in 1715.9
Since the colonies had no ecclesiastical courts,"° and neither law
was definitely settled in the reign of Elizabeth I that the ecclesiastical courts
could not grant absolute divorce. See SHELFORD, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 374
(Law Lib. ed. 1841) [hereinafter cited as SHELFORD]; BISHOP, MARRIAGE
& DIVORCE § 65 (6th ed. 1881) [hereinafter cited as BISHOP]; McGREGOR,
DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 22 (1957).
"The first recorded instance of a legislative divorce in England was
that of the Marquis of Northampton in the last year of the reign of Henry
VIII, but the act was repealed the very next year when the Roman Catholic
Mary I succeeded her father. The second instance was in 1688 but it was
with the greatest difficulty that the bill passed the House of Lords; all the
Lords Spiritual voted against it. Beginning in 1715 divorce acts became
common. However, they were so expensive that only the very wealthy could
afford them. Parliament would grant an absolute divorce only for adultery,
and then only after the petitioner had obtained both a divorce a nensa et
thoro from the ecclesiastical courts and a verdict at law for criminal conversation. The total cost of all these proceedings has been estimated at from
£600 to £800. BISHOP § 662; McGREGOR, DIVORCE IN ENGLAND 10-11, 17
(1957); NELSON, DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 400 (1895).
'BIsHOP §§ 9, 48; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *433.
'POYNTER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 168 (Law Lib. ed. 1836).
This doctrine was based on the biblical injunction "What therefore God hath joined
together, let no man put asunder." St. Matthew 19:6.
"POYNTER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 181; SHELFORD 364.
8

SHELFORD,

ibid.

'N.C. Gra. STAT. § 4-1 (1953).
"0The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina (1669), art. 45, provided
for a Chamberlain's Court which was to have jurisdiction over all matrimonial causes. However, the constitutions were never an effectual instrument of government and there is no record that the Chamberlain's Court was
ever established.
1 COLONIAL RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA xvii-xviii

(1886); 25 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA
HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 42-43 (1956).

123, 128 (1906); 1

LEFLER,

There were no bishops in America even though the Church of England
was established fairly early in most of the Southern Colonies, and eventually
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nor equity could decree divorces at common law, no type of divorce,
as such, was known in the colonial courts until requisite jurisdiction
was conferred by statute." Until the courts were granted divorce
jurisdiction legislative divorce was quite common in New England.12
However, no record exists of a legislative divorce in the southern
colonies until after the Revolution.'3 What transpired in North
Carolina during these hundred years? There is no reason to believe
that domestic tranquility was any more pronounced here than in
New England.
In the early years the answer lies most probably in the relatively
primitive state of society. The evidence indicates that most marital
difficulties were settled privately with little or no interference from
the state. 4 A dissentient couple simply separated and dissolved
their marriage by mutual consent. One or both might migrate to
another colony, or to the western territories, to begin life anew with
another mate. It is not improbable that in some cases both remained
in the same general vicinity. Certainly desertion of wives was a
very common occurrence, as is evidenced by the large number of
private acts passed for their relief. 5 There is at least one documented instance of a formal contract,' 6 the language of which bears
the clear mark of a lawyer, in which the parties agreed to dissolve
their marriage and bound themselves to refrain from prosecuting each
other should either remarry.
in all of the colonies. No bishop, no court. The Church was established in
North Carolina in 1703. N.C. Sess. Laws 1703, ch. 1, as amended, 1720,
ch. 2; 25

STATE REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA 166.

" Bisnop § 69. After the passage of the divorce acts in the several states

a lively dispute arose over whether the ecclesiastical law is part of the

common law, or whether divorce is purely statutory. The best theory holds

that ecclesiastical law is properly part of the common law, but is in abeyance
or vested solely in the legislature until courts competent to administer it are
established. Le Barron v. Le Barron, 35 Vt. 365 (1862). New York early
held the opposite view. Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557, 14 Am. Dec. 563

(N.Y. Ch. 1825). Accord, Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694
(1929) ; Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29 (1877) ; Hodges v. Hodges, 22 N.M. 192,

159 Pac. 1007 (1916).

Contra, Chapman v. Chapman, 269 Mo. 663, 192

S.W. 448 (1917) ; Fowler v. Moore, 46 Nev. 65, 207 Pac. 75 (1922) ; Crump
v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843); Le Barron v. Le Barron, supra. See also
Bis~rop §§ 56, 57, 69; NELSON, DIVORCE & SEPARATION § 10.
12
Especially in Massachusetts. 2 HOWARD, HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL
INSTITUTIONS 330-66 (1904).
13
Id. at 367.
14
JOnNSoN, ANTE-BELLum NORTH CAROLINA 217-23 (1937).
1 See text at note 35, infra.
"0Quoted in JOHNsoN, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA at 220. The
cited source is a MS among Legislative Papers 1807 in the North Carolina
State Archives. See Appendix III.
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As the state became more settled and property rights more important such primitive solutions became unfeasible. Soon after the
Revolution petitions for divorce began to pour into the legislature,1"
a body neither suited for nor sympathetic to such matters. Agitation for a general divorce statute was begun as early as 1790" s but
it took the legislature twenty-four years to respond. It was in such
a situation of stress that equity invented the action of alimony without divorce as a partial solution to an intolerable situation.
It is not certain just when the action of alimony without divorce
first began; certainly it was unknown to the common law. However, by 1796 the action was firmly imbedded in the equity jurisprudence of North Carolina. The earliest reported cases indicate
that it had been known for some years. 9 From 1796 to 1800 there
were at least four such suits from which the records have survived.20
"' At least as soon as 1779. "Read the Petition of Alexander Dickson of
Duplin County, praying a Divorce from Elizabeth his wife. Passed and sent
to the Senate." House Journal, 22 October 1779, 13 STATE REcoRDs OF
"Received from Commons a Bill for the
NORTH CAROLINA 932 (1896).
separation and divorcement of Alexander Dixon and Elizabeth Dixon, forinerly Elizabeth Molton, as man and wife, which was read for the first
time and Rejected." Senate Journal, 22 October 1779, 13 STATE REcoRDs OF
NORTH CAROLINA 843 (1896).
Applications for divorce were numerous. Mrs. Johnson found 266 such
petitions in the State Archives for the period between 1800 and 1835 (ten
years' petitions have not survived). In 1813 there were 22 applications for
divorce but only four were granted. In 1810 there were twenty petitions
and one granted. For the period surveyed by Mrs. Johnson 52 divorces
were granted out of 266 petitions, or roughly one out of five. The causes
most frequently alleged in the petitions were, in order: desertion to live
with another, desertion, cohabitation with a Negro, adultery, separation,
cruelty, prostitution, and wasting property. JoHNsON, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH
CAROLINA 217, 221. See also 2 LEFLER, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 41819.

1

sJOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUm NORTH CAROLINA 217.
"oThe evidence is of two sorts. In the case Anonymous, 2 N.C. 347
(1796), plaintiff's counsel refers to a similar case at Halifax "some years
ago" and says that "this is no new action." (No reference to the Halifax
case, given in Anonymous as Barrow v. Barrow, could be found in the incomplete records of the Halifax District Court in the State Archives.)
Second, all three of the reported cases, Anonymous, supra, Spiller v. Spiller,
2 N.C. 482 (1797), and Knight v. Knight, 1 N.C. 163 (1799), involve only
ancillary issues, such as the power of equity to sequester the husband's property prior to the decree, and whether the wife may sue for alimony without
a next friend. If the cases were novel we should expect from the reporter
some treatment of the substantive law of the action. Also, the appearance of
a similar case in 1823 indicates that the action survived well past the enactment of the divorce statute. Harrel v. Harrel, Pasquotank County Minutes
in Equity 1822-1850, Fall Term 1823, at 27-31.
" Spiller v. Spiller, supra note 19; Knight v. Knight, supra note 19;
Anonymous, supra note 19; Short v. Short, Equity Minute Docket, Halifax
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The original decree in the case of Spiller v. Spiller,2' decided in
1796, sheds much light on the nature of the action. Three issues
were submitted to the jury: (1) are the parties lawfully married,
(2) was the petitioner driven from her husband's home against her
will by his cruel conduct, (3) what property did the husband own
during the marriage.
These are exactly the issues which would have been decided by
the English ecclesiastical courts in a suit for divorce a mensa et thoro
for cruelty." If the action were intended merely as a remedy for
the duty of the husband to support the wife it is difficult to explain
the form of the second issue. A more probable form, if such were
the case, would have been "did the husband wilfully fail and refuse
to support the wife."
At common law alimony had no independent existence; it could
be granted only incidentally to the main relief sought by the petitioner.2" The main relief was invariably a divorce a mensa et
thoro.2 4 In order to obtain that relief the petitioner had to prove
either cruelty or adultery. Therefore, the petitioner in a suit for alimony without divorce in North Carolina had to prove that she was
entitled to what would have been a divorce a mensa et thoro in
England.
The court's decree in Spiller v. Spiller was that (1) the wife's
separate property of which she was possessed prior to her marriage
was confirmed to her, (2) the husband was to pay the wife two
hundred pounds for her support from the time of the separation to
Dist. Super. Ct., 6 November 1800, at 80-83; Mulford v. Mulford, Equity

Trial Docket, Wilmington Dist. Super Ct., May Term 1797.
The latter case is probably the case reported in 2 N.C. as Anonymous.
At May Term 1796 for the Wilmington District, "Ordered Deft give security
in the sum of £1000 to perform the decree of the court-that if he does not
give security within one month-a write of sequestration to issue." Mulford
v. Mulford, Wilmington Dist. Equity Trial Docket No. 65, May Term 1796.
The cryptic report in 2 N.C. refers to the right of equity to order sequestration in alimony without divorce actions. No other such case was found in the
docket book for the year 1796. The Equity Minute Book for the Wilmington
District has not survived.
1
Equity Minutes, Fayetteville Dist. Super Ct., October Term 1797, reported in 2 N.C. 483 on an ancillary issue. The full text of the decree is set
out in Appendix I.
22 See SHELFORD, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 427-28.
BIsnoP § 351; Head v. Head, 3 Atk. 547, 550, 26 Eng. Rep. 1115, 1116
(Ch. 1747) ; Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr. 191, 195, 30 Eng. Rep. 588, 59091 (Ch. 1793); Rees v. Waters, 9 Watts 90 (Pa. 1839); Lawson v. Shotwell, 27 Miss. 630, 633 (1854).
"'Ball v. Montgomery, supra note 23.
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the date of the decree, and (3) the husband was to pay the wife
fifty pounds semi-annually "during the term of her natural life."
This goes substantially farther than an English court could have
gone. As tenant by the curtesy a husband held absolute control
over his wife's property during their marriage, and after her death
if a child had been born alive of the union. The Siller decree destroyed that curtesy. The common law courts would never have
tolerated interference with property rights by the ecclesiastical
courts.25 The English divorce a mensa et thoro, being only a temporary suspension of marital duties, had no effect on property
rights.28
In addition the alimony payments in Spiller v. Spiller were clearly
intended to be permanent. By contrast the English divorce was
nearly always temporary in nature, looking toward reconciliation.2 7
LEGISLATIVE DIVORCE

The most serious defect of the divorce a mensa et thoro and the
action of alimony without divorce was they did not end the marriage. Neither party was free to remarry. The English remedy for
28
this harsh circumstance was absolute divorce by legislative act.
A private divorce bill did not pass both houses of the North
Carolina General Assembly until 1794.2" From then until 1835 at
least sixty-two absolute divorces were obtained from the legislature
by special act.80 There is no record of a legislative divorce a mensa
et thoro as such.
Twenty-three petitioners were successful in obtaining legislative
divorces in the twenty year period between 1794 and the passage of
the first general divorce statute in 1814.1 The latter statute ended
the practice for seven years, although petitions continued to come
before the assembly. In 1821 the legislature resumed the granting
of divorces and passed fifteen such acts until 1827. The preamble to
the general statute of 1827, attempting to halt legislative divorces
" See Setaro, History of English EcclesiasticalLaw, 18 B.U.L. REv. 342,
373-75 (1938).
" Kriger v. Day, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 316 (1824) ; Dean v. Richmond, 22
Mass.
(5 Pick.) 461 (1827); Clark v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 85 (Pa. 1843).
2T
POYNTER, MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 168.

2 9 See

note 4, supra.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 81. See note 17, supra.
20 See Appendix II for a table showing the number of divorces for the
years 1794-1835, and Appendix III for typical forms.
"1See text, JUDICIAL DIVORCE, Statutory Law, infra.
28
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and conferring the total legislative power over divorce actions on
the courts, complains that:
The numerous applications for divorce and alimony annually
presented to the General Assembly, consume a considerable
portion of time in their examination, and consequently retard
the investigation of more important subjects of legislation;
...such applications might be adjudicated by other tribunals
with less expenditure to the State, and more impartial justice
to individuals."2
The 1827 attempt to bind future assemblies was doomed to failure. Only five years later the pressure on the legislators from
constituents not willing to undergo the long and expensive process of
obtaining a judicial divorce, or unable to bring their case within
the narrow confines of the statutes, proved too strong. Private
divorce acts reappeared in 1832, culminating in fifteen in the session
of 1835. A constitutional amendment in the Constitutional Convention of 1835 permanently ended legislative divorce in North
Carolina by providing that "The General Assembly shall have power
to pass general laws regulating divorce and alimony, but shall not
have power to grant a divorce or secure alimony in any individual
case." 33 The amendment was incorporated into the new Constitution of 1868 in haec verba and has not been subsequently altered.
During its reign over matrimonial affairs, the legislature in some
cases, while declining to divorce the petitioner, granted other relief.
In 1803 the legislature began to confirm separation agreements relieving the husband of all duty to support the wife, all liability for
her debts, and destroying the marital estates of dower and curtesy.
The parties regained all the rights of unmarried persons except the
right to remarry. 34
Nearly every session of the legislature from 1797 to 1835 saw
the passage of omnibus bills confirming to married women their
separate property, or property they might thereafter acquire. 5 The
32 N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 19, § 1.
" N.C. Const. of 1776, Amendments of 1835, art. I, sec. IV, cl. 3, reprinted in Rev. Code of 1854, at 23; N.C. CONST. art. II,§ 10.
3,The only instances of such acts are N.C. Sess. Laws 1803, ch. 116;
1806, ch. 111, 114; 1807, ch. 108-110. See Appendix III.
" See Appendix III. The first of these acts was passed in 1794. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 101. It recited that the husband had deserted the wife
and was living in adultery. From 1794 to 1816 every legislature except two
(1801 and 1815) passed similar acts affecting the rights of from one to
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most popular private method of resolving marital difficulties was, as
we have seen, desertion or mutual separation. However, so long as
the husband lived the wife could not deal with her property in any
manner without his consent. Should the husband return to claim
his rights he was entitled to possession and all the rents and profits
earned in his absence as tenant by the curtesy. The wife's only
remedy was by special act of the legislature.
JUDICIAL DIVORCE

Statutory law
After abortive attempts in 1799 and 18086 the legislature passed
the first general divorce statute in 1814."7 The statute of 1814
authorized the Superior Courts of Law to grant either a divorce
from bed and board or an absolute divorce, in their discretion, for
natural impotency or adultery.3" The right of a jury trial on all
issues of fact was guaranteed. Condonation, recrimination, and the
fact that the husband "allowed of the wife's prostitution or exposed
her to lewd company whereby she became ensnared to the crime,"
were express bars to relief. Abandonment, cruel treatment, "such
indignities to her person as to render her condition intolerable or
life burthensome," and a malicious turning out of doors were additional grounds for which the wife might obtain a divorce from bed
and board. The court might award alimony not to exceed one-third
of the husband's estate incident to a divorce from bed and board.
The legislature, however, was not ready to make divorces easy
to obtain. In addition to the severely limited grounds for divorce
provided, it was required that the judgment of the court be contwenty-two women.

After an absence of six years they re-appear in 1823

and persist until the amendments of 1835 to the constitution. See, e.g., N.C.
Sess. Laws 1808, ch. 115 (twenty-two women named); 1823, ch. 160-63;
1825, ch. 44; 1826, ch. 143; 1827, ch. 71, 86, 117, 123, 125, 145, 147" 1834,
ch. 105, 106; 1835, ch. 82.
"'

JOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUm

NORTH

CAROLINA

218.

The act failed by

only seven votes in 1808. Ibid.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1814, ch. *869. (The chapter numbers of all Public
Laws through the session of 1820 are those assigned in Potter's Revisal, in
conformity with the practice of the North Carolina General Statutes Commission. Potter omitted all the private laws and re-numbered the session
laws consecutively. An asterisk (*) placed before a chapter number herein
denotes the number assigned in Potter's Revisal. All other references are to
the original numbering.)

The divorce and alimony laws were codified from time to time as follows:
N.C. Revised Statutes of 1837, ch. 39; N.C. Revised Code of 1854, ch. 39;
Battle's Revisal of the Laws of N.C., ch. 37 (1873).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1814, ch. *869.
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firmed. by the General Assembly before the decree might become
effective. The petitioner had to allege and prove that the cause had
existed for at least six months prior to the filing of the petition to
discourage hasty action. The final decree could not issue until at
least twelve months had elapsed to encourage reconciliation. A tax
of ten pounds was exacted from the defendant. It was also provided
that the innocent party might marry again.3 9
Two years later, in 1816, the legislature provided that the divorce
from bed and board should automatically secure to the wife any
property she might subsequently obtain, unless the court specifically
decreed otherwise." The reason given in the preamble to the act
was that "cases of great hardship often occur, the husband being at
liberty to return and squander away the estate of the wife, subsequently obtained." '
From 1814 to 1818 the legislature confirmed seven divorces
granted under the statute of 1814.42 In the latter year the judgments of the courts in divorce matters were made conclusive. 43 The
twelve month waiting period was repealed in 1824 as well as the
ten pound tax. 4
The statute of 1827 was apparently an attempt to settle the
matter of divorce, so far as the legislature was concerned, for by that
act the Superior Courts of Law were given absolute discretion to
decree divorces "whenever they may be satisfied . ..of the justice

of such application." 4 5 A right of appeal to the supreme court was
conferred and it was expressly provided that the guilty party might
never marry again during the lifetime of the petitioner on pain of
conviction for bigamy, which at that time was punishable by death.46
"' The positive form proved ambiguous and was clarified in 1827. N.C.

ch. 19.
Sess. Laws 1827,Laws
1816, ch. *928, clarified by N.C. Sess. Laws 1819, ch.
' N.C. Sess.
*1007.
Ibid.

4N N.C. Sess. Laws 1816, ch. 68, 119, 124; 1817, ch. 37, 64; 1818, ch. 38
(two divorces in one act). Whether these acts are technically legislative
divorces is arguable. We may assume that confirmation of the judicial
decrees was perfunctory. In view of the personal opinions of the supreme
court justices it is certain there were no rash decisions in divorce matters
there. See note 1, supra.
"'N.C.Sess. Laws 1818, ch. *968.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1824, ch. 18. The section reference to the session laws
to this statute in the Revised Statutes of 1837 is in error.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 19, § 1.
,If the defendant were a woman she might be branded instead. The
bigamy act was first passed in 1790. N.C. Sess. Laws 1790, ch. 11, 25 STATE
REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLIxA 74. This statute contained a peculiar proviso
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The divorce statutes were further clarified in 1828 by specifically
giving the law courts jurisdiction over alimony without divorce,
The
which until then had been exclusively an equitable remedy."
statute appears to have been declaratory of the equity practice for
the remedy was allowed wherever a wife could show grounds for a
divorce from bed and board.4 8 It was broadened a little to include
the additional grounds that the husband was an habitual drunkard
or a spendthrift.49 The statute provided that a decree of alimony
without divorce should secure to the wife any property she might
subsequently acquire," and the next year the law courts were given
power to allow a woman to sue in her own name for alimony without divorce, 1 both of which had been equity practice from the beginning. 52
By 1852 the substantive statutory law of divorce was rounded
out by specific conferral of concurrent jurisdiction over all divorce
and alimony causes on the equity courts, 53 provision for removal of
divorce suits to the supreme court as in suits in equity, 4 and the
that it should' not extend to any "persons... who are or shall be at the time
of such after marriage divorced according to the mode established..."
There was no "mode established" until 1814. The author of the bill probably was in sympathy with the agitation for a divorce law which Mrs. Johnson states began that year. JOHNSON, ANTE-BELLUXm NORTH CAROLINA 217.
The bigamy statute, as amended in 1809 and 1823, was codified in the
Revised Statutes of 1837, ch. 34, § 14. By 1854 the punishment had been
reduced to a fine, imprisonment, one or more public whippings, and a branding on the cheek with the letter B. Revised Code of 1854, ch. 34, § 15.
'" See

note 19, supra, and accompanying text.

"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1828, ch. 44, § 2.
"'This statute, much amended, is still in effect. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 50-16
(1950). It is a curious fossil but still used, primarily because under it there
is no limit on the amount of alimony which may be awarded. If the wife
obtains a divorce from bed and board under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-14, the
amount of alimony may not exceed one-third of the net annual income of the
defendant. The limitation dates from the act of 1814 and has been carried
forward ever since.
o N.C.

Sess. Laws 1828, ch. 44, § 4.

"'N.C. Sess. Laws 1829, ch. 28. This was an extension of section 2 of
the act of 1819 which gave the same result in suits for divorce. N.C. Sess.
Laws 1819, ch. *1007.
" Spiller v. Spiller, Appendix I; Knight v. Knight, 1 N.C. 163 (1799).
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1834, ch. 15.
' N.C. Sess. Laws 1842, ch. 43. This statute was a result of the decision
in Holloman v. Holloman, 22 N.C. 270 (1839), which held that the supreme
court had only appellate jurisdiction over actions for divorce even though the
suit was brought in equity. Construing the statutes conferring jurisdiction
concurrently on the law and equity sides of the courts in pan materia, it was
held that a jury trial was required in divorce suits whether brought at law
or in equity. Therefore, there was no right of removal to the supreme court
for trial. North Carolina had traditionally been chary of equity procedure
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allowance of alimony pendente lite." It remained in this state until
the complete revisions of 1868 (procedural) and 1872 (substantive)
when the basic statutes constituting the present North Carolina
divorce law were enacted."
Case law

As might have been expected, suits for divorce were from the
beginning looked upon with judicial disfavor in the supreme court.7
The statute of 1814 had required that "when either has separated
himself from the other and is living in adultery,"" the court might
grant a divorce if it chose to do so. It was soon held that the
phrase did not embrace the case of adultery by one, who against his
will, had been abandoned by the other, nor where the act of adultery
had occurred during a separation by mutual consent." The cruelty
required by the court was physical violence, or at the very least
extreme indignities coupled with threats to the wife's life."0
and from the beginning had required jury trials there. For a brief period,
1823 to 1873, no jury was required, although an advisory jury was frequently employed. See Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv.
157, 159-60 (1953).
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1852, ch. 52. This was also the result of a judicial
decision. In Wilson v. Wilson, 19 N.C. 377 (1837), the court had held that
alimony pendente lite could not be given without a statute.
These statutes, as amended, are codified in N.C. Gmr. STAT. ch. 50.
ZT See note 1, supra.
8 N.C. Sess. Laws 1814, ch. *869, § 1.
59
Whittington v. Whittington, 19 N.C. 64 (1836) ; Moss v. Moss, 24 N.C.
55 (1841); Wood v. Wood, 27 N.C. 674 (1845); Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 98
(1851). In Wood v. Wood, supra, the court in a dictum stated that even
though the parties were living in a state of voluntary separation, and the
party suing was not entitled to an absolute divorce, the court might in some
cases decree a divorce from bed and board to prevent spurious heirs being
forced on the husband. The same case modified the stringency of the rule
somewhat by providing that where the husband's outrageous conduct forced
the wife to flee his house, the separation would be deemed his, and not hers.
In Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N.C. 327 (1819), the court refused to grant
a divorce for adultery committed before the passage of the act of 1814, on
grounds that a retroactive application of the act would be ex post facto. The
court reasoned that adultery had been made a crime in 1805. N.C. Sess. Laws
1805, ch. *684. To allow a divorce for adultery retroactively would be to
increase the punishment of a crime after the fact. Barden v. Barden, 14 N.C.
548 (1832) held that the act of 1827 was retroactive and neither cited the
Dickinson case nor discussed ex post facto.
" Hansley v. Hansley, 32 N.C. 506 (1849); Coble v. Coble, 55 N.C. 392
(1856); Everton v. Everton, 50 N.C. 202 (1857); Erwin v. Erwin, 57 N.C.
82 (1858) ; Joyner v. Joyner, 59 N.C. 322 (1862). The latter case held that
a husband might prudently chastise his wife with a horse-whip so long as
the beating was not unjustified or unduly harsh.
The supreme court did not hear a case of alimony without divorce on
appeal until after the Civil War, nor did it consider the other statutory ground
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The absolute discretion over the causes for which divorce might
be granted conferred on the courts by the statute of 1827 went untapped. The 1827 act was construed as being in addition to the
statute of 1814, not as abrogating its restrictions on the cause of
adultery."' Nor was it utilized to create new causes. Even so
heinous an offense, to a nineteenth century Southerner, as the birth
to his wife of a mulatto child sired before the marriage, did not move
the justices."2 So far from delighting in his unlimited freedom, the
great Chief Justice Ruffin was profoundly disturbedY He felt the
legislature surely could not have intended the court to allow their
personal opinions 4 to determine whether the parties should be freed
from their bond.65 In the absence of any expression of legislative
intent to guide them the justices were loathe to undertake independently the task of molding new substantive law.66
The sole use made of the discretionary power was the curious
bringing of annulment actions under the divorce statutes. 67 It was
reasoned that the complete delegation of legislative power to the
courts in divorce matters was an incorporation into the law of North
Carolina of the entire English law of matrimonial causes, so far as
it was suited to the conditions of this country.6" Thus, instead of
annulling the marriages of idiots and lunatics on common law
for divorce, impotency. The one case involving impotency, Smith v. More-

head, 59 N.C. 360 (1863), was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since peti-

tioner had brought the suit in the wrong county.
"1Collier v. Collier, 16 N.C. 352 (1829); Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C.
535 (1832).
02 Scroggins v. Scroggins, supra note 61.
At the same term the court
annulled a marriage for this cause. Barden v. Barden, 14 N.C. 548 (1832).
In Barden the petitioning husband alleged that he was induced to marry the
defendant by her false representation that the mulatto child with which she
was pregnant was his. Chief Justice Ruffin, hesitante, acquiesced in the
opinion of his brethren and annulled the marriage on grounds of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
62 Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535 (1832).
E Judging from Justice Ruffin's opinions, if this had been true there would
have been no divorce whatever in North Carolina.
"Scroggins v. Scroggins, 14 N.C. 535 (1832). Chief Justice Ruffin
wrote the opinion in every divorce case involving substantive law until his
aeath. Justice Pearson dealt with the procedural aspects.
"A rather strange attitude today! See Weeks, Book Review, 41 N.C.L.
lRv. 325 (1963).
"7Crump v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843) (lunatic); Johnson v. Kincade,
37 N.C. 470 (1843) (idiot). The reporter, Iredell, included the court's decree
in his report of Crump v. Morgan as "such cases are novel in the State, and
the form of the decree was settled by the court itself." 38 N.C. at 103 n.a.
" Crump v. Morgan, 38 N.C. 91 (1843). This case is often cited in support of the proposition that ecclesiastical law is part of the common law.
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grounds that they lack contractual capacity, the court decreed
"divorce" under the act of 1827.6"
CONCLUSION

Thus we have seen that extrication from an unhappy union was
no easy task in ante-bellum North Carolina.7" Although the courts
were given a rare opportunity, to build the substantive law of divorce
unhampered by statute or stare decisis, the invitation was declined.
Had there been judicial sympathy with the action of divorce, North
Carolina might have escaped the stultifying technicalities of divorce
law which have plagued litigants to' the present day. We may
lament the loss.
JosEPHa S. FERRELL
Associate Editor
'o

The court never had occasion to determine whether denominating the

action a "divorce" invoked the statutory prohibition against the guilty party's
remarriage. This certainly would not have been the English rule, since annulment is a declaration that the marriage has never had any legal existence.
" 0 In 1822 the court had held that divorce might be granted only for
grounds enumerated in the statute of 1814. Long v. Long, 9 N.C. 189 (1822).
There the defendant had communicated venereal disease to the petitioner.
From the beginning a strict correspondence between allegation and proof
was required. See, e.g., Foy v. Foy, 35 N.C. 90 (1851).
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Appendix I*
DECREE

Court met according to Adjournment
present the Honourable
Samuel Ashe &
John Williams, Esquires
Margaret Spiller
VS.
James Spiller
The cause being heard by the Jury their verdict was as follows:
James Spiller, and Margaret Spiller, formerly Marg't Stuart, are
lawfully married and that said Margaret was driven and forced
away from her Husband's house by her Husband, said James
Spiller, and not by her own accord; and that James Spiller was
possessed of Property to the following amounts at those several
times, Viz:
In the year 1784, in Lands 2,341 acres valued at £1,150
£1,200
In Negroes 12 in number, valued at
Total £2,350
In the year 1789, In Land 5,342 acres valued at £2,671
£1,800
In Negroes 18 in numb. val'd at
Total £4,471
In the year 1792, In Land 1,439 acres valued at £ 719
£ 800
In Negroes 8 in numb. val'd at
Total £1,519
And that the said Spiller in the year 1791 conveyed to Elizabeth
Spiller 1,200 acres of Land valued at £900, also ten Negroes valued
at £1,000.
- 2,000
Also that he conveyed to Ellen Spiller in the year
acres of Land valued at £1,500 and ten Negroes val'd at £1,000.
DECREED that Margaret Spiller retain as her own absolute
right and property all the Estate which she was possessed of prior
to her intermarriage with the said James Spiller, and which she
* Equity Minutes, Fayetteville Dist. Super. Ct., April term 1797. Punctuation has in some instances been modernized. The manuscript is in the
North Carolina State Archives and may be found in the Equity Minute Book
above cited. The suit began 23 April 1791 and took six years.
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now holds by virtue of the Articles of their Intermarriage, and by
the delivery of the said James to her. And that said James pay to
her, the said Margaret his wife, the sum of two hundred pounds
currency to enable her to pay and discharge the expense of her
maintenance and support which has accrued from the - day ofto the present time, which said two hundred pounds to be paid in
payments as follows:
(to wit) £50 to be paid on the 1st day of December next following
the date hereof, the residue of the said £200 to be paid in half yearly
payments, from the 1st day of December-to wit-;650 on the 1st
day of June 1795, £50 on the 1st day of December 1795, and the
remainder on the 1st day of June, 1796.
AND IT IS FURTHER DECREED that the said James pay
to the said Margaret £100 per annum for and during the term of
her natural life, and for her sole and separate use, and as her alimony, to be paid to her in half yearly payments-that is to say, £50
to be paid on the 6th day of April next following the date hereof,
£50 the residue of the said £100 on the sixth day of October next
following, and so to continue to make such payments and at such
stated times as above directed during the Term of her natural life
aforesaid, the payments to be made at the usual place of residence
or dwelling of the said Margaret, or at the Office of the Clerk and
Master in Equity for the District of Fayetteville, and that all the
Estate Real and personal of the said James are bound and made
subject to pay and satisfy the said several sums of money above
expressed and directed to be paid, and on failure of any of said
payments, the said Margaret, may, after the expiration of ten days
after such failure, take out Execution against the Goods and Chattels, Land & Tenements of the said James, in the same manner as
is directed by the Act of Assembly passed at Tarborough on the
18th day of November, 17 87-Unless said James shall give good
and suf't Security in the sum of £2,000 currency with two or more
sufficient Freeholders before the Master in Equity, subject to the
exception of the Court, for the faithful and perpetual payment of the
Said Annuity of £100, at the time and places above stated, after
such security being given and approved of by the Court, or said
Margaret, then the Estate of the said James to be released and discharged.
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Appendix II
LEGISLATIVE DIVORCES,

Year

No. of divorces$

1794-1835
Statutory reference*

1794
1796
1798
1802
1804
1806
1808
1810
1811
1812
1813
1821
1822
1823
1824
1825

1
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
3
5
4
2
1
2
3
4

81
99
106
114, 115
123, 124
104, 105
78
130
98-100
37-41
41, 84, 92, 95
104, 106
68
141, 142
135-137
90, 102, 109, 139

1826

3

134

1832
1833
1834
1835

1
2
6
15

Total

62

106
104, 107
76-81
62-77

* Reference is to chapter number of the session laws for the year indi-

cated.
t From 1816 to 1818 the legislature confirmed 7 divorces granted by the
Superior Courts. N.C. Sess. Laws 18,16, ch. 68, 119, 124; 1817, ch. 37, 64:
1818, ch. 38.
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Appendix III
TYPICAL FORMS

I.

Private Divorce.
"This indenture made this 24 Day of May 1803 ...Between
John Farrow... and Rebekah Farrow his wife... witnesseth, that
whereas some unhappy differences have arisen Between them in
consequence of which they have mutually agreed to separate themselves... John and Rebekah do firmly agree with Each Other to
finally Desolve the Marriage Contract once made between us and
that Either of us may and Shall have Free and undenied Liberty to
Live Single or to Entermarry again with any other person.., and
we do further agree... that we will not carry on any prosecution
against the other so marrying...."'
This agreement was confirmed by the legislature: "Whereas the
said John Farrow ...and Rebekah his wife, from the most imperious necessity, in its nature insurmountable, have mutually agreed
,nlive separate and apart from each other forever...
"Be it enacted... that ...the said Rebecca Farrow shall have,
hold, possess, and enjoy, all such property as she now possesses, or
that she may hereafter acquire.. . and not subject to the control...
of her husband, nor liable to any of his debts or contracts.
"And be it further enacted... that ...John Farrow shall not be
liable or subject to pay any debts of his said wife Rebekah, whether
the same be for necessities or otherwise; nor shall he be liable or
subject to any demand ...for alimony... nor shall the said Rebecca hereafter claim or have dower.., or be entitled to any distributive share of his estate." 2
1I. Legislative Divorce.'
Be it enacted... that A. B. of the county of Wake, and wife of
C. D. be, and she is hereby declared to be separated and divorced
fully and absolutely from her husband C. D., and that she be restored to all the privileges and immunities of a feme sole, and enjoy
the same, as amply and entirely, as if she had never been connected
by the bonds of matrimony, with her husband the said C. D.
Quoted in JOHNsoN, ANTE-Br.Lum NORTH CAROLINA 220 from a MS
in Legislative Papers, 1807, in the North Carolina State Archives.
2N.C. Sess. Laws 1807, ch. 107. Similar acts appear in N.C. Sess. Laws
1803, ch. 116; 1806, ch. 111, 114; 1807, ch. 108-110.
'See, e.g., N.C. Sess. Laws 1835, ch. 62.
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III. Acts Confirming Property to Married Women.4
Be it enacted that A. B. of Wilkes County, wife of C. D., be,
and she is hereby entitled to hold, possess and enjoy, in her sole
right, any estate, either real or personal, which she [now has or]
may hereafter acquire, by her own industry, purchase, gift or otherwise, in as full and ample a manner as if she had never been married
to her said husband; and she is hereby authorized to prosecute or
defend any suit in her own name, in any court within this State,
in the same manner as if she had never been married.
Evidence-Hearsay-Admissibility of Hospital Records
In Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.' the defendant sought
to introduce in evidence its insured's hospital record in an attempt
to show that she had made certain misrepresentations about her
health when applying for a life insurance policy. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that although records of this type are hearsay, they are generally admissible, being within the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. However, admission of the particular record involved was denied on the grounds that it contained
privileged communications between physician and patient.'
At common law, business records offered to prove the facts recorded therein were admissible upon a showing that the records
were made in the regular course of business, with the personal
knowledge of the entrant, at or near the time of the transaction
' See, e.g, N.C. Sess. Laws 1827, ch. 71. The bracketed words in this
form were not always present. The first of these acts was passed in 1794.
It recited that the husband had deserted the wife and was living in adultery.
N.C. Sess. Laws 1794, ch. 101. The number of women named in the acts
varied from one to twenty-two. In at least one a man was included. N.C.
Sess. Laws 1808, ch. 115.
1257

N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).

GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953), provides "no person, duly authorized
to practice physic or surgery, shall be required to disclose any information
2 N.C.

which he may have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe for

such patient as a physician or to do any act for him as a surgeon: Provided,
that the presiding judge of a superior court may compel such disclosure,
if in his opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of justice."
The court in the instant case held that this privilege extends to hospital records which contain entries made by physicians, or under their direction,
pertaining to information obtained while treating the patient in a professional
capacity. 257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331 (1962).
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recorded, and that the entrant was dead or otherwise not available
as a witness.3
Hospital records have been admitted in evidence under the same
conditions as business records,4 but the common law requirement
that each person making an entry in the record must be present as
a witness or have his non-availability accounted for, has often resulted in the record's exclusion.5 With the advent of modern hospital practices, where any number of physicians, nurses, and interns
are involved in caring for a patient, the entrants, if identifiable at
all are likely to be so numerous as to make their presence in court
impractical. Even if each entrant were called to testify, he could
hardly be expected to recall the facts upon which any one entry was
based, and in the end, he himself would have to rely on the record.'

Therefore, it seems that the presence of the entrant could add little
or nothing to what the record itself contains.7 The absence of the
entrant should not impugn the reliability of the record, for the
systematic recording of hospital records, the lack of motive for
their falsification, and the fact that a patient's life may depend upon
their accuracy are adequate assurances of their trustworthiness. 8
A few courts, recognizing the reliability of hospital records, and
the impracticality of calling each entrant, have allowed undue inconvenience to be an adequate reason for the entrant's absence, provided that someone familiar with the records verifies them and
testifies that they were made in the regular course of business.'
'Ward v. Music, 257 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1953); Missouri Forged Tool
Co. v. St. Louis Car Co., 205 S.W.2d 298 (Mo. App. 1947) (record excluded because entrant not shown to have been unavailable); Lebrun v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 83 N.H. 293, 142 Atl. 128 (1928); Jameson v. First
Say. Bank & Trust Co., 40 N.M. 133, 55 P.2d 743 (1936); Mercer v. Denne
[1905] 2 Ch. 538; Smith v. Blakey, L.R. 2 Q.B. 326 (1867).
"E.g., Grossman v. Delaware Elec. Power Co., 34 Del. 521, 155 Atl. 806
(1929); Gearhart v. Des Moines Ry., 237 Iowa 213, 21 N.W.2d 569 (1946);
Pickering v. Peskind, 43 Ohio App. 401, 183 N.E. 301 (1930); Conlon v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 56 R.I. 88, 183 Atl. 850 (1936); Hill v.
National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 11 Tenn. App. 33 (1929).
'E.g., Branch v. Woulfe, 300 I1. App. 472, 21 N.E.2d 148 (1939) (record excluded because only one of two nurses produced) ; Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 (1938).

'6 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1707 (3d ed. 1940).
" See MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 290 (1954); Hale, Hospital Records as
Evidence, 14 So. CAL. L. Rv. 99 (1941).

' Globe Indem. Co. v. Reinhart, 152 Md. 439, 137 Atl. 43 (1927) ; see 6

WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1707; MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 7,

§ 290.
'E.g., United States v. Wescoat, 49 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1931); Whittaker v. Thornberry, 306 Ky. 830, 209 S.W.2d 498 (1948) ; Lund v. Olson,
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However, the reluctance of most courts ° to dispense with the requirement of calling each entrant has led a number of states to adopt
legislation to remedy the situation, either in the form of the Model
Act" or the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. 12

Such

acts are intended to broaden the scope of admissibility of business
records.' 3 Both the Model Act and the Uniform Act contain broad
definitions of "business," 14 thereby allowing for the admissibility
of hospital records.' 5 Also both acts eliminate the necessity of producing the numerous persons who may have had a part in the creation of the record.' 6
Although hospital records are generally admissible to prove
clinical facts,' 7 a problem is presented when a record entry is based
upon a statement by the patient as to the cause of the accident which
resulted in his injury.'" It has been held'" that such information,
182 Minn. 204, 234 N.W. 310 (1931); St. Louis v. Boston & Me. R.R., 83
N.H. 538, 145 Ad. 263 (1929) (record prepared by 31 nurses would have

been admissible had it been verified by the record clerk).
"'E.g.,National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Threlkeld, 189 Ark. 165, 70
S.W.2d 851 (1934) (identification of record by hospital custodian held to
be insufficient); Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Utah 331, 85
P.2d 819 (1938).
"E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-180 (1958); N.Y. Civ. PRuc. AcT § 374
(1962); see also Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1959), as
amended, 75 Stat. 413, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (Supp. 1961), which was based
upon the Model Act.
'E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 600.01-.04 (1945); OHIo REv. CODE §
2317.40 (Supp. 1962).
" Frampton v. Hartzell, 179 Cal. App. 2d 771, 4 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1960);
Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Scherpenisse, 187 Md. 375, 50 A.2d
256 (1946).
"The Model Act provides that "the term 'business' shall include every
business, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind." The Uniform
Act contains an even broader definition by adding "whether carried on for
profit or not." Compare TEX. RE V. STAT. art. 3737e (Supp. 1962), which
incorporated the most important sections of both the Model Act and the
Uniform Act.
" Case v. Vearrindy, 339 Mich. 579, 64 N.W.2d 670 (1954) (construing
a statute based upon the Model Act); Roeder v. North Am. Life Ins. Co.,
259 Minn. 168, 106 N.W.2d 624 (1960) (construing the Uniform Act).
"'United States v. Olivo, 278 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1960) ; Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955).
' See McCoRMICK, op. cit. supra note 7, § 290.
The objection to a patient's statement as to how the accident occurred
is not whether the statement was actually made, but whether it was in fact

true.
" Cox v. State, 3 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E.2d 879 (1958), where the plaintiff, an inmate in a state mental hospital, sought to introduce in evidence a
record entry relating to the cause of an accident which was based upon a
statement by another inmate. The entry was excluded because the inmate
was under no business duty to relate such information. Williams v." Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283, 129 N.E.2d 417 (1955).
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when imparted by persons not acting pursuant to a business duty,
should be excluded as multiple hearsay.2" The reason advanced for
this holding is that there is no guarantee as to the truth of voluntary hearsay statements made by third persons not acting in the
regular course of business.2 Other courts have held that when the
record states the patient's version of how the accident occurred, its
admissibility is dependent upon whether the entry was made within
the scope of hospital business. 22 Since the business of a hospital is
to diagnose and treat the ailments of its patients, any entries containing statements not germane thereto are not made in the regular
course of business.23 Therefore, any self-serving statements relating to the cause of a patient's accident are inadmissible,2 4 except to
the extent that they are of aid in diagnosis or treatment. 25
Record entries containing a physician's diagnosis of a patient
based upon observations and objective data are generally admissible
in evidence. 2' However, when the record contains a diagnosis in
" When record entries are based upon statements made by third persons,
the facts contained therein are neither within the personal knowledge of the
entrant nor of the witness verifying the record; therefore such entries
amount
to hearsay on hearsay.
21
Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), where a policeman's report was excluded because it was based upon information imparted
by a bystander. This case was severely criticized in 5 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 1530(a) (3d ed. 1940).
2 E.g., Borucki v. MacKenzie Bros. Co., 125 Conn. 92, 3 A.2d 224
(1938); Brown v. St. Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954).
"Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 168 A.2d 501 (1961), where
the court held that in order to be admissible, "statements in a hospital record
must be pathologically germane to the physical condition which caused the
patient to go to the hospital." In Commonwealth v. Harris, 351 Pa. 385, 41
A.2d 688 (1945), where a Negro man was being tried for murder, a hospital
record contained a statement by the deceased victim that he was shot by a
white man. The court excluded the record saying, "It was really none of
the physician's professional 'business' who shot the patient" and that neither
the inquiry nor the answer was in the regular course of hospital business.
2, Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 64 A.2d 117 (1949); Gilligan
v. International Paper Co., 24 N.J. 230, 131 A.2d 503 (1957); In Green v.
City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63 (1948), a record entry
stating that the patient fell off a street car and caught her heel was excluded
because the statement had no relation to medical treatment.
" See Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 44 Del. 283, 58 A.2d 689 (1948),
where the court held that the plaintiff's recorded statement that he twisted
his ankle while walking along a sidewalk was pathologically germane to the
injury, as it aided the physician in diagnosis. The court also noted that the
statement was an admission by the plaintiff. Lee v. Housing Authority, 203
Md. 453, 101 A.2d 832 (1954), where an entry stating that the patient came
to the hospital "after being burned when a gas stove exploded near her"
was held to be a proper entry relating to the nature and cause of the injury
which would aid the physician in treatment.
"'Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Tawney, 233 F.2d 353
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the form of an opinion, its admissibility is somewhat more dubious,
for the opposing party is left without the opportunity of crossexamination on matters of a technical and perhaps conjectural
nature. Accordingly, in a number of cases the record has been
excluded where it contained diagnostic opinions as to the patient's
This result has been based on the
condition or cause of illness."
assumption that medical opinions, formulated from symptoms which
are difficult of interpretation, lose the guaranty of trustworthiness
A
which is required for the admissibility of hospital records.2
majority of the courts, however, have rejected this line of reasoning
and will allow a doctor's opinion to be shown by the record as long
as it meets the general tests of reliability.2 9 A further hindrance
to the presentation of opinion evidence is the qualification of the
physician as an expert without his appearing in court. It has been
suggested that this may be done by showing that the physician has
30
been duly licensed or is employed by a reputable hospital.
North Carolina has no statute governing the admissibility of
business records as evidence, 3 ' but has resolved the problem on common law principles. 2 The early cases involving the competency of
regularly kept business records held that they could be received in
evidence only if the entrant were dead.3 3 Since that time, the North
Carolina Supreme Court has adopted a more realistic rule, taking
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (record stated that glass fragments were discovered during
a rectal examination of the patient); D'Amato v. Johnston, 140 Conn. 54,
97 A2d 893 (1953) (it was doctor's opinion that the patient was intoxicated).
" Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 961 (1958) (psychiatric diagnosis was excluded); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Knudsen v. DuffeeFreeman, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 872, 99 S.E.2d 370 (1957); Young v. Li ddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78, 309 P.2d 761 (1957); Keller v. Wonn, 140 W. Va.
860, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
'2 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, supra note 27 at 304.
" E.g, Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Buckminister's
Estate v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1944); Allen v. St. Louis
Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1956); People v. Kohlmeyer, 284
N.Y. 366, 31 N.E.2d 490 (1940); McReynolds v. Howland, 218 Ore. 566,
346 P.2d 127 (1959).
" See Allen v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 29; Hale, supra note
7, at 108. See also Thomas v. Hogan, supra note 29.
"1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-42 (1953), enacted in 1756, provides for the
admission of book accounts under sixty dollars, but this statute is very limited and covers nothing that would not otherwise be admissible under the
business records rule today.
" See text accompanying note 3 supra.
"Ray v. Castle, 79 N.C. 580 (1878); Sloan v. McDowell, 75 N.C. 29
(1876); Bland v. Warren, 65 N.C. 372 (1871).
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into account modern business conditions under which it would be
impossible to attempt to produce every person involved in recording
a particular transaction. Accordingly, the court under this more
modern rule will admit business records in evidence if they are
made in the regular course of business, contemporaneous with the
transaction involved, and if they are authenticated by a witness who
is familiar with such records and the manner in which they are
made.3 4
The Sims"5 case has removed any doubt as to the possibility of
entering hospital records into evidence under North Carolina's liberal business records rule. The court held that although hospital
records are hearsay when offered as primary evidence, they nevertheless may be admitted as business records once the proper foundation has been laid.30 In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that hospital records are probably more accurate than the
independent recollection of the persons making them and that a
motive for their falsification is lacking. Possibly the court's confidence in the reliability of regularly kept hospital records will lead
to the admission of expert medical opinion incorporated in the
record. This supposition is substantiated by the fact that the record
in the principal case contained a number of diagnostic opinions which
would have been admissible except for the physician-patient privi7
3

lege.

Notwithstanding the reliability of hospital records, the court
pointed out that any entries which are irrelevant or which amount
to hearsay on hearsay should be excluded from jury consideration.,
Although there was no limitation placed upon what was to be excluded as hearsay on hearsay, this should not be construed to include
all record entries merely because they were not made upon the entrant's personal knowledge. The North Carolina Supreme Court
has consistently held, with regard to business records, that an entrant's personal knowledge of a transaction recorded is unnecessary
"' Smith Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Dixon, 246 N.C. 136, 97 S.E.2d 767
(1957); Dairy & Ice Cream Supply Co. v. Gastonia Ice Cream Co., 232
N.C. 684, 61 S.E.2d 895 (1950) ; State v. Lippard, 223 N.C. 167, 25 S.E.2d
594 (1943); Breneman Co. v. Cunningham, 207 N.C. 77, 175 S.E. 829
(1934); Fort Worth & D.C. Ry. v. Hegwood, 198 N.C. 309, 151 S.E. 641
(1930); Flowers v. Spears, 190 N.C. 747, 130 S.E. 710 (1925); Firemen's
Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452 (1905).
"257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
"Id. at 35, 125 S.E.2d at 329.
'*Id.
at 39, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
"Id. at 35, 125 S.E.2d at 329.
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so long as both the entrant and his informer are acting under a
business duty. 9 The court's prohibition of multiple hearsay was
statements made by a
obviously meant to exclude any extra-judicial
40
patient referring to the cause of his injury.
In view of the court's liberal opinion in the Sims case, it would
seem that in the future the only obstacle preventing more frequent
use of hospital records as evidence will be the physician-patient
privilege. But, now that it is clear that such records may be admitted, perhaps the trial judge will closely examine them and not
hesitate to exercise the discretion granted him to disclose the privileged communication "if in his opinion it is necessary to a proper
administration of justice."'"
S. EPES ROBINSON
Evidence-Physician-Patient Privilege-Compelling Disclosure of
Privileged Information-Discretion of the Trial Judge
While at common law no privilege was recognized for communications between patient and physician,' North Carolina and over
thirty other states3 have by statute created such a privilege. The
"E.g., Breneman Co. v. Cunningham, 207 N.C. 77, 175 S.E. 829 (1934) ;
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 138 N.C. 42, 50 S.E. 452
(1905), where record entries made by a train dispatcher based upon information obtained from a station agent 100 miles away were admissible to
show the position of a train at a given time.
,0 See note 20 supra.
,N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953), in addition to establishing the physician-patient privilege, provides that the trial judge may order the disclosure
of such privileged communications in order to facilitate a proper administration of justice. This provision in the statute was enacted to provide against
an injustice resulting from the suppression of evidence by the patient's
claim of privilege. In Sins, the Supreme Court, recognizing the legislature's
intended purpose in making this provision, cast considerable doubt upon the
soundness of the trial judge's decision not to compel disclosure of the record.
' "If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure, he
would be guilty of a breach of honor and of great indiscretion; but to give
that information in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is
bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever."
The Duchess of Kingston's Trial, 20 How. St. Trials 573 (1776). See also
Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960); State v. Martin, 182
N.C. 846, 849, 109 S.E. 74, 76 (1921) ; STANSBURY, EvIDENCE § 63 (1946).
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953).
North Carolina enacted its privilege
statute in 1885 and it has remained in its original form, without amendment, to date. A similar statutory privilege is also provided for communications between clergymen and communicants. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.1
(Supp. 1961).
' New York in 1828 became the first state to depart from the commonlaw rule and provide for the privilege. Since then over two-thirds of the
states have enacted similar legislation. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380
n.5 (McNaughton rev. 1961) where these statutes are compiled and quoted.
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avowed object of the privilege is to inspire confidence in the patient
and encourage him to make full and frank disclosure to the physician
4
as to his symptoms and conditions.
This privilege has often been criticized on the ground that it
deprives the courts of relevant and reliable facts which in many
cases would materially affect the outcome of litigation. The usefulness of such legislation has been further questioned by the contention that the object of the privilege-to encourage disclosure to the
physician-is unrealistic. It is argued that seldom would a person be
deterred from seeking medical aid and disclosing his conditions
merely because of the possibility that such information could be used
in a subsequent judicial hearing.'
The North Carolina General Assembly has enacted what is
acclaimed by some as the most desirable form of a privilege statute.(
By recognizing that the privilege may hamper the proper administration of justice by concealing the entire truth, but at the same time
realizing that a patient must be able to place the utmost faith and
confidence in his attending physician, a delicate balance was struck.
The North Carolina statute provides:
No person, duly authorized to practice physic or surgery,
shall be required to disclose any information which he may
have acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him
to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act
for him as a surgeon: Provided, that the presiding judge

'Yow v. Pittman, 241 N.C. 69, 84 S.E.2d 297 (1954); State v. Martin,
182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (1921). The New York Commissioners on Revision stated with respect to the privilege, "unless such consultations are
privileged men will be incidentally punished by being obligated to suffer
the consequences of injuries without relief from the medical art." Quoted
in MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 101, at 212 n.6 (1954). The North Carolina
privilege statute is adapted from the original New York statute.
But see MCCORMICK, op. cit. supra at 212 where the author states with
reference to the theory of "full and frank disclosure" to the physician as the
basis of the privilege: "if this were the only interest involved it is hard to
suppose that the desire for privacy would outweigh the need for complete
presentation of the facts in the interest of justice."
See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 2380(a); Chaffee, Privileged
Communications: Is .Tustice Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's
Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943); Purrington, An
Abused Privilege, 6 COLUm. L. REv. 388 (1906).
' See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2381, at 832. The American
Bar Association Committee on the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, in
1937-38, recommended retention of the physician-patient privilege, but with
the addition of the North Carolina exception.
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of a superior court may compel such disclosure, if in his
opinion the same is necessary to a proper administration of
justice.'
By allowing the trial judge, in his discretion, to compel disclosure
of what would normally be privileged information, it is generally
felt that the evils of a physician-patient privilege are minimized.'
Nevertheless, the recent case of Sims v. Charlotte Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co.' vividly illustrates that such is not always the case.
In Sims the beneficiary sued to recover the proceeds of a life

insurance policy. The defendant contended it was only obligated to
refund the premiums because the insured had made material misrepresentations in the application for insurance which was the basis
for the issuance of the policy. The defense was based on hospital
records which showed that "the insured, nineteen days after she
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
In order for the privilege to exist, there must exist the relation of physician and patient at the time the information in question is obtained. State v.
Wade, 197 N.C. 571, 150 S.E. 32 (1929); State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552,
143 S.E. 187 (1928); State v. Martin, 182 N.C. 846, 109 S.E. 74 (.1921).
The information sought to be suppressed on the grounds of privilege must
be information which was necessary to enable the physician to perform his

professional services for the patient.

Non-confidential matters are thus

apparently not privileged. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137
(1960); State v. Newsome, supra; State v. Martin. supra; Smith v. John L.
Roper Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 60 S.E. 717 (1908). The privilege will
extend to all information obtained by the physician for the purpose of prescribing for the patient regardless of whether such information is received
by direct communication from the patient himself, or is obtained by the
physician through his own examination and observation. Smith v. John L.
Roper Lumber Co., supra. The privilege is that of the patient alone and
cannot be taken advantage of by another. Capps v. Lynch, supra; State v.
Wade, supra; State v. Martin, supra. The privilege may be waived by the
patient, or after the patient's death, by his personal representative. For a
discussion of the problem of waiver, see Note, 16 N.C.L. Rav. 53 (1937).
If the trial judge decides to exercise his statutory power, and compel disclosure of what would otherwise be privileged information, a finding that
the disclosure is necessary "to a proper administration of justice" must
appear on the record. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N.C. 199,
139 S.E. 228 (1927), discussed in Note, 6 N.C.L. REV. 85 (1927).
' In McCoRmICK, op. cit. supra note 4,.§ 108, at 224, the author states
with respect to the North Carolina privilege statute: "A clear-eyed and
courageous judiciary, trial and appellate, with an appreciation of the need
for truth and a fear of the suppression, could draw the danger of injustice
from the privilege, under this provision."
The Virginia privilege statute similarly provides that the trial judge may
compel disclosure of what would otherwise be privileged communications if
such is felt to be necessary in the interest of justice. VA. CoDs ANN. § 8289.1 (Supp. 1962). The remainder of the privilege statutes in effect in
other jurisdictions, do not provide for such an exception.
p257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
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applied for insurance and five days after issuance of the policy, was
suffering from cirrhosis, chronic pancreatitis, tubular nephrosis and
chronic alcoholism" ;10 whereas in the application, the insured represented that she was in good health, and had never had heart or
kidney trouble, high blood pressure, or any other disease not specifically mentioned. The trial court excluded these hospital records
without assigning any reason for its ruling. 1 To this exclusion an
exception was taken, and the insurance company, appealing from an
adverse verdict, claimed such exclusion to be error.
When evidence is excluded by the trial court without assigning
a reason for its ruling, and the question of the admissibility of such
is the basis of an appeal, the lower court's ruling will be affirmed if
the evidence in question was inadmissible on any legal ground.' 2
Thus in Sims if the hospital records were inadmissible for any
reason, there was no error. The plaintiff on appeal claimed that the
records were properly excluded on the grounds of (1) hearsay, and
(2) privileged communication between patient and physician.' The
court rejected the first contention, stating that even though the
hospital records were hearsay, they were nevertheless admissible
under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.' 4 The
court held, however, that the records did constitute privileged communications between physician and patient and accordingly affirmed
the exclusion. 5
"Old. at 39, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
"Id. at 34, 125 S.E.2d at 328; Record, p. 18, Sims v. Charlotte Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 32, 125 S.E.2d 326 (1962).
"5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1464(3) (1958); cf. Temple v. Temple,
246 N.C. 334, 98 S.E.2d 314 (1957); State v. Fleming, 204 N.C. 40, 167
S.E. 483 (1932).
1It should be noted that on appeal, the defendant insurance company
confined its argument with respect to the hospital records to the question of
hearsay. No argument on the question of exclusion on the grounds of
privilege was made.
14 The fact that the hospital records were admissible under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule is discussed in Note, 41 N.C.L. REV.
621 (1963).
There is some controversy over whether hospital records should constitute communications between physician and patient and be subject to the
privilege. The court, in holding that G.S. § 8-53 did apply to hospital records insofar as they contain entries made by the attending physician or
surgeon, or under their direction, first noted that the statute "extends not
only to information orally communicated by the patient, but to knowledge
obtained by the physician or surgeon through his own observation or examination while attending the patient in a professional capacity and which was
necessary to enable him to prescribe." Quoting from Smith v. John L. Roper
Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 62, 64, 60 S.E. 717, 71 (1908). The construction
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The inequities of the Sims decision are apparent. Evidence
which would tend to show a misrepresentation sufficient to invalidate the insurance policy'" was suppressed because of the physicianpatient privilege. It is indeed questionable whether the benefits to
be derived by the deceased-insured keeping his infirmities confidential
outweigh the benefits to be gained, in the form of substantial justice,
from a full disclosure of the factsY It would seem that the present
placed on the statute by the court in Smith was dictum, but it has been
accepted and repeated by the court in later cases. See, e.g., Brittain v.
Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 254 N.C. 697, 120 S.E.2d 72 (1961). The court
further relied upon Annot., 22 A.L.R. 1217 (1923) wherein it is stated that
the privilege extends to a hospital physician. It was felt that if a hospital
physician was incompetent personally to testify, then information obtained
by him and recorded in records was similarly inadmissible. The court was
careful to limit their holding to entries made by the physician, or under his
direction, which pertain to communications and information obtained in
attending the patient, such information being necessary to enable him to
prescribe for the patient. "Any other information contained in the records,
if relevant and otherwise competent, is not privileged. The effect of the
statute is not extended to include nurses, technicians, and others, unless they
were assisting or acting under the direction of a physician or surgeon."
257 N.C. at 38, 125 S.E.2d at 331.
Justices Higgins and Parker concurred in the result, but felt that G.S.
§ 8-53 should not apply to hospital records. Justice Higgins states: "To me,
the exclusion of hospital records is as out-of-date as the bustle, asafoetida,
and the tomahawk. The statute does not require the exclusion unless a modern hospital is a person duly authorized to practice physic, and then only as
to information he may have acquired." 257 N.C. at 42, 125 S.E.2d at 334.
The majority of the jurisdictions hold that hospital records do constitute
privileged information insofar as they contain data acquired by the attending
physician or under his direction. See McComicxiC, op. cit. supra note 4, §
290, at 613; 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 2382, at 839; Annots., 75
A.L.R. 378 (1931); 120 A.L.R. 1124 (1939); cf. Annots., 44 A.L.R.2d 553
(1955); 79 A.L.R.2d 890, 914 (1961).
"6The insurance policy in question provided: "I agree that no obligation
shall exist against said Company... unless upon said delivery of the policy
I shall be alive and in good health." Even absence such a provision in the
policy, it has been held that a misrepresentation of the type involved is a
material misrepresentation and is sufficient to invalidate the policy. Tolbert
v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 236 N.C. 416, 72 S.E.2d 915 (1952).
17 In actual practice the evidence is concealed only from the jury. In
the present case the contents of the hospital records were revealed to the
attorneys and the presiding judge, as well as all in the court room; for as is
the usual practice with objectional evidence, the jury was sent out and the
evidence presented so that the judge might rule on it. The contents of the
hospital records not only appear in the Superior Court Record, but also are
found in the Supreme Court Report of the case. Thus in reality, the only
object served by the exclusion is to prevent the jury from knowing the
truth at the time of the trial. How is the patient then benefited by the
privilege-possibly only in the form of an unjust insurance claim allowed
because of suppression of evidence.
The insurance company could have protected itself in one of two ways.
It could have included a waiver clause in the policy providing that the
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case was one in which the trial judge should have, in the exercise of
his discretion, required disclosure for the proper administration of
justice. The supreme court was apparently of the same opinion, for
they clearly intimate in their opinion that it would have been proper
for the trial judge to exercise his discretionary authority and allow
the hospital records into evidence. Foreseeing possible inequities in
the future because of the privilege, the court further stated "judges
should not hesitate to require the disclosure where it appears to
them to be necessary in order that the truth be known and justice
be done.""
Why did the supreme court refuse to overrule the trial court's
exclusion in view of the recognized injustice resulting from the exclusion of the records? The court assigned as its reason "the absence of a finding by the trial court that in its opinion, the admission
of the hospital records was necessary to a proper administration
of justice"' 9 and without such a finding, the court felt that it was
bound to hold the exclusion without error.
It can be argued that, under the circumstances, the absence of
a finding of necessity by the trial judge should not bind the court
on appeal. When evidence is excluded at the trial without reason,
such exclusion will be affirmed on appeal if excludable on any
ground. Thus in Sims the court was required to consider all possible grounds for exclusion. There being only one ground for exclusion-the physician-patient privilege-since hearsay was eliminated,
the question was whether or not it was permissible for the trial
judge to exclude the records on this ground. An argument may be
constructed that such an exclusion would be error.
If privileged communication was the basis of the trial court's
exclusion, the presumption on appeal is that the court made this
ruling in the exercise of its discretion rather than as a matter of
law.2" While a discretionary order of the trial judge is generally
physician-patient privilege is waived in certain cases. The use of such a
clause is discussed in Note, 16 N.C.L. Rxv. 53 (1937). The insurance company could also have required a physical examination prior to the issuance
of the policy. Because of the low value of the policy, no medical exam was
required in the present case.
18257 N.C. 32, 39, 125 S.E.2d 326, 331.
1 Id. at 39, 125
S.E.2d at 332.
0
Brittain v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 254 N.C. 697, 703, 120 S.E.2d 72,
76 (1961). It is clear that if the trial judge excluded the evidence as a
matter of law, rather than in the exercise of its discretion, the exclusion
would be in error. Capps v. Lynch, 253 N.C. 18, 116 S.E.2d 137 (1960).
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conclusive on appeal, such is not the case if the trial judge appears
to have abused his discretionary authority. 2 Thus in Sims the
court on appeal could well have concluded that if the trial judge
excluded the records because of privilege-and it will be presumed
that such exclusion is the result of an exercise of discretion-he
abused his discretion. The records were hence not excludable on
the grounds of privilege. This would be a desirable result for it
would seem to be clearly an abuse of discretion to fail to compel
disclosure of evidence which would materially alter the outcome of
the litigation involved.
In an earlier North Carolina case the court was faced with an
almost identical fact situation. In Creech v. Sovereign Camp of the
Woodmen of the World22 the defendant denied liability on an insurance policy on the grounds of misrepresentations of a material
character in an application for insurance. The insured had claimed
that he had suffered no disease within the past five years. The defendant sought to introduce into evidence testimony of a physician
which would have shown that he had treated the insured in recent
years. The trial judge excluded this testimony on the grounds of
privilege, and further refused in the exercise of his discretion to
require disclosure. On appeal, the exclusion was affirmed. While
it could be argued that the effect of this decision is to hold that a
refusal to compel a physician's testimony which shows a misrepresentation on an insurance policy application does not constitute an
abuse of discretion, such does not in fact appear to be the impact of
this decision. In Creech the evidence showed that the insured died
of pneumonia contracted due to exposure on a hunting trip. The
" While there has thus far been no case in which a trial court's exclusion
of evidence on the grounds of privilege has been reversed because of an
abuse of discretion, it is nevertheless felt that such is the rule. With respect
to other discretionary rulings by the trial judge, the rule is clearly established that such are subject to review and reversal in cases of an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962);
Goldston v. Wright, 257 N.C. 279, 125 S.E.2d 462 (1962); State v. Grundler, 251 N.C. 177, 111 S.E.2d 1 (1959); In the Matter of Humphrey, 236
N.C. 142, 71 S.E.2d 915 (1952); Elliott v. Swartz Indus., Inc., 231 N.C.
425, 57 S.E.2d 305 (1949). See generally 1 STRONG, N.C. INDEX Appeal &
Error § 46 (1957).
The Virginia privilege statute (see note 8 su*pra) which similarly vests
discretionary power in the trial judge to compel disclosure has not been
interpreted on this point.
211 N.C. 658, 191 S.E. 840 (1937). While there is language in this
case to the effect that a discretionary ruling of a trial judge is not reviewable, it is believed that the rule is otherwise in cases of an abunse of discretion. See note 21 supra.
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death was in no way connected with the misrepresentation in the
insurance application. In fact the court stated: "We cannot see how
defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of the evidence of the
physician." 23 Thus this case simply seems to be one in which the
court on appeal felt that the interests of justice would not be promoted by requiring disclosure by the physician, and consequently
there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to admit the testimony
into evidence.2 4
In the principal case the misrepresentations were directly related
to the cause of death-the death was actually the result of a disease
which the insured represented he did not have. Thus Sims presents a much stronger case for reversal on the grounds of abuse of
discretion than did the Creech case where the death was unrelated to
the insured's misrepresentations.
While the inequities of the Sims case may be more academic
than real in that a new trial was granted on other grounds,2" it
may nevertheless represent an unfortunate precedent for the exclusion of physician-patient information. It is hoped that in the future
the court will not consider this case as a binding precedent for the
proposition that privileged information such as here, which will
materially affect the outcome of the litigation, may nevertheless be
excluded by the trial judge and such exclusion is not subject to
review. Had the court on appeal adopted the procedure suggested
in reviewing the exclusion of the hospital records, possible confusion
as to the meaning of this decision would have been avoided, and the
delicate balance of interests embodied in the North Carolina privilege statute would have been preserved.
G.B.H.
Outlawry: Another "Gothic Column" in North Carolina
Once one of the law's most potent weapons, outlawry has been
relegated in modern society to an existence as an historian's curiosity.
It is obsolete in England and exists in any form in only three of the
United States.
2 Id.at 662, 191 S.E. at 843.
"In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Boddie, 196 N.C. 666. 146 S.E. 598
(1929) there is also language which would seem to intimate that exclusion
of medical testimony tending to show misrepresentations by the insured on
his application is not an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. Ho~vever,
this language is dictum in that this was not the issue raised and decided by
the appeal.
.'The new trial was granted for an error in the charge.
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COMMON LAW

Simply stated, one who is outlawed is put outside the protection
or aid of the law. Outlawry was a process by which a defendant or
person in contempt on a criminal or civil process was declared an
outlaw.' In ancient England, the status of a freeman was his laga,
a word that was subsequently confused with the Latin word lex.2 A
man's laga was his worth: strictly speaking, the compensation that
would have to be paid to his kinsmen by anyone who should kill
him.' A person that refused to answer when he was summoned, or
who escaped after being discovered in the commission of a crime,
lost his laga; he was utlagatus, or as we term it, an outlaw.4 He
was then a wolf, caput lupinum, to be "knocked in the head"5 by
anyone meeting him.6
As early as the time of the Druids in England, the law of the
land made full use of deprivation of law as to the disobedient. Part
of the Druid creed proposed this sanction, "Let the disobedient be
excommunicated; let him be deprived of the benefits of the law; let
him be avoided by all...

."'

Sometime during the Anglo-Saxon

period outlawry was limited to charges of capital crimes, being in
substance a process by which punishments could be inflicted on
criminals who refused to answer personally for their crimes.' Flight
'BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1255 (4th ed. 1951). "Outlawry is a punishment inflicted on a person for contempt and contumacy, in refusing to be
amenable to, or abide by, the justices of the court which hath lawful authority to call him before them; and it is a crime of the highest nature, being
an act of rebellion against that state or community, of which he is a mem-

ber." 3

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*283 [hereinafter cited

BLACKSTONE].

Outlawry has not by any means been confined wholly to the English common law, but has been found in many parts of the world as a weapon of
establishing and insuring protection of society from those who breach their
duties. RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY § 22 (Hornbook ed.
1936). In Greece, by the time of Solon, outlawry was already an ancient
practice conferring on the citizenry at large the right to take a human life.

CALHOUN, THE

GROWTH OF CRIMINAL LAW IN ANCIENT GREECE

66, 68,

120 (1927). In early Rome the state deprived the criminal of his "right to
fire and water." HUNTER, ROMAN LAW 187, 218 (4th ed. 1903).

'RADIN,

ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY

§

22.

'Ibid.
'Ibid.
'This quaint expression, frequently occurring in common law discussions of outlawry, is still in use colloquially in many parts of North Carolina.

'4

BLACKSTONE *320.
" STEARNS, THE GERMS AND

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND

11 (1889).
'2 POLLACK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
1898) [hereinafter cited POLLACK & MAITLAND].

LAW

578-81 (2d ed.
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was considered an admission of guilt, and outlawry was decreed in
the defendant's absence without a trial. 9 The effect of this judgment
was to place the person completely outside the protection of the
law.' 0 It was no offense to kill an outlaw; in fact it appears to have
been the duty of every man to kill him as one would a despised
animal. By breaking the law the wrongdoer had gone to war with
the community; the community then declared war on him. 1
As the courts and government became more effective and a
wrong against an individual was presumed a wrong against the
community, private war became obsolete. Outlawry then became a
process for compelling one's attendance at court to answer to the
community and was extended to misdemeanors.'
Upon an appeal
of felony or presentment, an indictment was issued charging the
accused with the felony. The sheriff was instructed to bring the
accused into court. If the summons was returned unserved the
court issued a writ of exigent to the sheriff directing him to demand the accused at five consecutive court sessions (quintus exactus)
to appear and answer the indictment. If after these preliminaries
the accused did not appear, or was not apprehended, a judgment of
outlawry was pronounced by one of the coroners of the county."8
Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770).
An outlawry in the case of a felony or treason amounts to a conviction
and attainder of the offense charged in the indictment, as much as if the
offender had been found guilty by his country. 4 BLACKSTONE *319. Although at an early date the person outlawed could have been slain by anyone with impunity, this right was later taken from civilians and permitted
only by the sheriff. By the time of Edward III "[I]t was resolved by the
judges, for avoyding of inhumanity, and of effusion of Christian blood, it
should not be lawfull for any man, but the sherife onely, (having lawfull
warrant therefore) to put to death any man outlawed, though it were for
felonie; and if he did, he should undergoe such punishments and paines of
death as if he had killed any other man; and so from thenceforth the law
continued until this day." 3 COKE, INSTITUTES *383.
112 POLLACK & MAITLAND 459.
"It is the right and duty of every man
to pursue him, to ravage his land, to burn his house, to hunt him down like
a wild beast and slay him; for a wild beast he is; not merely a 'friendless
man' he is a wolf." FLBTA, bk. I, ch. 28 (transl. & ed. by Richardson &
Sayles), 72 SELDEN Soc. 72 (1955).
12 Instead of becoming substantive punishment, it became mere civil
procedure. 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND 459.
1"3 BLACKSTONE, Appendix III, at xx-xxi (Christian ed., Georgetown,
D.C., 1818). Professor Holdsworth, in 9 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 254
(1926), quotes from the Pleader's Guide by "Mr. John Surrebutter" a
succinct summation of outlawry procedure:
But first attach him, and attend
With capias ad respondend.
Let loose the Dogs of War and furies,
10
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Once the outlawry was adjudged the accused was, in effect, convicted of the crime' 4 and his goods and chattels were forfeited to the
crown.'" The harshness of outlawry as it was known prior to
Bracton's time was announced by Fleta:
Those who are outlawed are rightfully deprived of all
benefit of the law. By this judgment alone, without judicial
inquiry, they will be undone. They will not be able to appeal
to others, nor is any man bound to them, although they
themselves are bound to satisfy all to whom they have an obligation, lest their condition should be bettered by reason of
their outlawry, whereas it ought rather to be worsened. And
they forfeit their inheritances and tenements, and homages
and fealties are dissolved and all other things which by mutual
agreement have been contracted by themselves 'and their
heirs, near and remote. And should they have been begotten
after the felonie was committed, not only are heirs excluded
from their paternal, but also from their maternal, inheritances
and from everything, because they are begotten of the seed
and blood of a felon.'"
Because the punishment or result of outlawry was so severe,
Testatum, Alias and Pluries;
But if at length non est invent,
At him again with Exigent
Then smite him as a Coup de Grace
With Utlagatum Capias
Exacted, outlawed, and embruted,
His head, to head of wolf transmuted,
Compelled by write of Exigenter
The Lists against his will to enter.
"4Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (KB. 1770). The
outlaw then, in effect, is condemned in his absence without a trial, and
unless he can set aside the judgment, he has no means of re-opening the
matter and establishing his innocence before a jury. He does, however,
have the recourse open to move to set aside the outlawry by writ of error.
In order to obtain this, he must render himself in custody and pray in person
allowance of the writ at the bar. If he should succeed in having the outlawry set aside he is put to answer the indictment on which the outlawry
was founded.

2

HALE,

HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 403 (Wilson ed.,

London, 1778).
3 BLACICSTONE *284. The lands of the felon were seized by the crown,
but held for only a year and a day. They then returned to the overlord
under whom the outlaw had held. MAGNA CARTA [1225], c. 22 [9 Hen. 3,
1 Stat at Large 1 (1762)].
16 FLETA, op. cit. supra note 11. bk. I, ch. 28.
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the courts were always inclined to reverse an outlawry judgment
on the slightest proof of error either in law or fact in order to allow
the outlaw the privilege of a trial on the indictment. The proceedings in outlawry are "exceedingly nice and circumstantial: and if
any single minute point be committed or misconducted, the whole
outlawry is illegal."' 7 One of the common grounds for reversal
was that the defendant was away from the country at the time the
exigent was awarded. However, by statute absence from the country was not a grounds for reversal in cases of indictment for treason.' The reason for that statute was "that men would commit treason and presently fly beyond the sea, and remain there till witnesses
who should prove the treason were dead; then return and reverse the
outlawry for error of their being beyond the sea."'
Even the
alleged traitor, however, could reverse his outlawry if he submitted
to the court within a year after the outlawry was pronounced.20
In the event the defendant succeeded in reversing the outlawry
or was pardoned, what was the result? Firstly, he had to stand
trial for the offense on the original indictment. Secondly, he came
back into the world "like a new-born baby, quasi modo genitus,
capable of acquiring new rights, but unable to assert any of those
he had had before his outlawry."'" He always had to carry the
pardon of his outlawry with him because if he did not show it, he
might have been slain by those who did not know that he had received the grace of pardon or a reversal.2
In misdemeanors, outlawry was regarded as a punishment for
contempt of court in not appearing, and was generally more severe
than the punishment that would have been inflicted had the outlaw
been convicted on the indictment in court. It worked a forfeiture
of his goods and chattels and all the profits of his real estate; it
could have involved perpetual imprisonment, and could not be reversed without writ of error. 23 However, it did not operate as a
conviction of the misdemeanor charged. 4 Once the outlawed
BLACKSTONE *320.
An Act for the Punishment of Diverse Kinds of Treasons [15.52], 5

174

8"

& 6 "Edw.
6, c. 11, § 7.
The King
v. Armstrong, 3 Mod. 47, 87 Eng. Rep. 29 (K.B. 1684).
20 "Being captured," however, was not "submitting" for the purposes of
the statute. Id.
" 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND 460.
22 FLETA, op. cit. supra note 11, bk. I, ch. 28.
2 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B. 1770).
Id. A woman was not outlawed but "waived," a procedure known as
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person appeared in court, except in cases of felony and treason,
he could post bail or recognizance by statute of Elizabeth; he was
also permitted to employ an attorney to represent him in court by
a statute of William and Mary. 5
Although it is only briefly mentioned in most histories of English law, outlawry was no rarity. It apparently was a common form
of treating persons who refused to answer the court's indictments.
For example, we can gather from the records of Lincolnshire,
England, for the period 1381 until 1396, a rather high percentage
of outlawry decrees. In three courts, the Justice of the Peace, the
Justice of Gaol Delivery, and the Kings Bench, there were 483
felons indicted. Of these 483 indictments, only eighty-one were
tried. Twenty-three were presumed to have been guilty, fourteen
secured pardons, four pleaded clergy, and only five were sentenced
to hang. The remainder, which would have been over eighty-three
per cent, were outlawed for failure to appear for trial.26 For trespass, there were considerably more convictions. There were 589
indicted of whom about 218 paid fines, while twenty-nine were
These
acquitted. The rest, or about one half, were outlawed."
and
of
Pollack
the
findings
with
agreement
statistics are in general
Maitland, who stated that "the number of men outlawed at every
eyre is very large; ten men are outlawed for one who is hanged. 28
Although criminal outlawry is no longer resorted -to in England
it has never been abolished-it merely passed into disuse.2 9 The
last instance of a proceeding in outlawry was in 1859; there was no
judgment of outlawry in that case since the defendant surrendered
waiviaris wnidieris, since she had never been sworn to the law (an oath of
allegiance to the leet), COKE, INSTITUTES *475, nor could a corporation be
outlawed since outlawry always presupposes the right to arrest. A corporation could not be arrested.

Failure to appear in court represented by an

attorney merely worked an attachment of the corporation's property. 1
BLACKSTONE *477.
" An Act to Prevent Malicious Informations in the Court of King's
Bench, and for the More Easy Reversals of Outlawries in the Same Court

[1692], 4 & 5 W. & M., c. 18.

" KImBALL, REcoRDs OF SOME SEssIoNs OF THE PEACE IN LINCOLNSHIRE,

at lii (1955).
1381-1396,
27
Id.at lvi.
Closely allied to outlawry was the eccle" 1 POLLACK & MAITLAND 461.
siastical penalty of excommunication. In Saxon laws the excommunicate is
"God's outlaw." Bracton said he was a "spiritual leper." Id.
"9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Criminl Law § 373 (2d ed. 1933).

Outlawry has been expressly abolished in civil proceedings. Civil Procedure
Acts Repeal Act [1879], 42 & 43 Vict., c. 59, § 3.
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before the process could be completed." The last judgment of outlawry rendered by a court in England was in 1855.81 Due to the
failure to consider outlawry when the other phases of criminal law
have been modernized, now should a defendant be outlawed upon a
charge of felony or misdemeanor, there appears to be no means provided in England for securing the reversal of the outlawry. 2 The
only apparent way in which a judgment of outlawry can be reversed
8
or rendered inoperative is by a royal pardon or by act of Parliament.
8 4

UNITED STATES

In 1784 one Doan was executed in Pennsylvania upon a writ of
outlawry.8 He had been indicted for robbery in Pennsylvania, but
could not be found for trial. After having been outlawed according
to the English procedure set out above, he was attainted and subsequently apprehended. Doan appealed from his sentence of hanging (which was ordered to be executed upon the outlawry) on the
ground that he was in New York at the time he was being sought
in Pennsylvania. The execution was subsequently carried out after
consideration by the Supreme Executive Council and the courts
of Pennsylvania. Relying heavily on the English precedent, the
court remarked:
We would next observe generally that an outlawry for
a felony is a conviction and attainder of the offense charged
in the indictment, and has been as long in use as the law itself. The intention of it was to compel all men to submit to
the laws of this country, and to prevent their escaping justice,
by flying and staying away until all the witnesses are dead.
"09 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Criminal Law § 373 n.(f).
1

Id.
Since writs of error have been abolished, how could an appeal of outlawry be effected today? See Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23.
9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND Criminal Law § 374.
Outlawry is unknown in the United States in civil actions. Hall v.
Lanning, 91 U.S. 160 (1875); Nathanson v. Spitz, 19 R.I. 70, 31 At. 690
(1895). The Massachusetts court did, however, give lip service to civil
outlawry, saying that where an action was brought against a partner who
had absconded with partnership funds, "without the aid of a statute many
courts allowed the action to proceed against such of the partners as were
served within the jurisdiction, treating the sheriff's return of non est inventus as to the absent partner as a substitute for the common law process
of outlawry." Tappan v. Bruen, 5 Mass. 193 (1809). Outlawry has never
been known in the federal courts. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,
171 (1958).
" Respublica v. Doan, 1 U.S. 86 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1784).
32
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It is a very important part of the criminal law; and we do
not find an occasion, where any question of law, upon a writ
of error to reverse an outlawry, in a criminal case, has ever
undergone a serious litigation.

... [I]f there be anything

improper in taking away the life of a man upon an attainder
by judicial outlawry, it belongs to the legislature to alter the
law in this particular;the judges cannot do it. 6
Virginia dealt with the problem of outlawry in 1821." The
quintus exactus was returned, but no judgment was given. The
Attorney General moved for a judgment of outlawry. The court
denied the judgment, saying that the judgment of outlawry should
38
be given by the coroner as in England, not by the courts.
Alabama decided in 1871 that the outlawry of :England, being
repugnant to her constitution and inconsistent with her institutions,
was without any force in that state.3 9 The legislature had passed a
statute permitting anyone in the state to shoot and kill certain
persons in disguise who were terrorizing the state by lynchings and
assassinations. The court held that this legislation was not true
outlawry. 40 Further, they held that a person could not be outlawed
by the legislature, but only by a judicial proceeding; an act of the
legislature is not "by due process of law."'"
New York provides for outlawry in an action for treason, and
no other. The procedure is provided by statute and requires that
the application be made only upon a bench warrant issued for the
apprehension of a person who has pleaded guilty, or has been convicted but cannot be found.4" The result of such outlawry is rather
severe, since the outlaw is deemed civilly dead and all his property
is forfeited to the state.48
Of all the states only Pennsylvania continues to preserve by
statute common law outlawry almost in the form that prevailed in
the days of Blackstone.4" The Pennsylvania statute provides that
when any person has been indicted in any court of criminal jurisoId. at 90.

Commonwealth v. Haggerman, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 244 (1821).
Virginia abolished outlawry in 1887. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-15 (1960).
Dale County v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, 140 (1871).
0
' Id. at 141.
',

"2 Ibid.

" N.Y.

" N.Y.

"PA.

CODE OF CRIM.
CODE OF CRIM.

STAT. AxN. tit.

PRoC. §§ 814-25.

§ 819.
19, § 1321 (1930).

PROc.
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diction within the commonwealth for "treason, felony of death,
robbery, burglary, sodomy or buggery, or as accessories before the
fact to any of the same offenses," common-law outlawry may be
declared in the event the accused cannot be found or does not present
himself before the court. Execution or imprisonment can result
without a trial, once the outlawry is decreed !
Texas abolished outlawry in all forms by constitutional provision in 1876.46 Six other states have taken cognizance of outlawry
in their constitutions. North Carolina provides that "no person
Arkansas,
ought to be outlawed but by the law of the land."4
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Tennessee have
essentially the North Carolina provision, but have added "or by
judgment of his peers." 48 Of the six states which provide constitutionally for outlawry, only North Carolina has implementing statutory machinery. 9
Outlawry was apparently imported into our country with some
early vigor, but during the nineteenth century was either abolished
or fell into disuse. No recent American cases involving judicial
outlawry proceedings have been found. Except for the limited New
York statute, the unused Pennsylvania statute, and the North
Carolina adaptations to be discussed next, outlawry has gone the
way of enfeoffment in the United States.
NORTH CAROLINA

From passage of the reception statute in 1715 until the Revolution, the English law of outlawry was the law of North Carolina.
"'"[S]aid sentence of outlawry shall have the legal effect of a judgment
upon the verdict or confession against the person so outlawed." PA. STAT.
This statute is taken from an act of 1791
ANN. tit. 19, § 1321 (1930).
nearly verbatim, according to the historical note. The compiler included in
the historical note a statement of the Report on the Penal Code defending
the statute. "They form in themselves as good a system of outlawry as can
now be suggested," the Commission reported, "and are so skillfully and
ably drawn as to require no amendment of importance. Although proceedings in outlawry have been rarely reported in our state, yet they are indispensably
necessary in every complete system of criminal jurisprudence."
"6 TEX. CONST. art I, § 20.
'N.C. CONST. art. I, § 17. Cf. MAGNA CARTA [1225] c. 29 [9 Hen. 3,
1 Stat. at Large 1 (1762)]: "No freeman shall... be outlawed...but by
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."
' ARIc. CONST. art. II, § 21; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTs art. 23;
MAsS. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTs art. 12; N.H. CONST. art. I, § 15;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1950).
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The common law was enlarged somewhat by the Colonial Assembly. In 1770 an act was passed giving the Attorney-General power
to prosecute riot charges in any superior court in the province and to
"declare outlaws all those who avoided the summons of the court
for sixty days." The act allowed "such outlaws to be killed with
impunity."5 Persons who were charged with counterfeiting and
refused to surrender to the authorities within sixty days were susceptible to being killed by any of the citizenry on sight.5 ' Another
statute dealt solely with runaway slaves. Such slaves were not
generally declared outlaws, but if a slave ran away "and killed
cattle," a proclamation was to be issued against him by any two
justices of the peace, and if he did not return immediately he could
be killed on sight.52
In 1868 the current outlawry statute was enacted. It provides:
In all cases where any two justices of the peace, or any
judge of the Supreme, superior, or criminal courts shall, on
written affidavit, filed and retained by such justice or judge,
receive information that a felony has been committed by any
person, and that such person flees from justice, conceals himself and evades arrest and service of the usual processes of
the law, the judge or the two justices, being justices of the
county wherein such person is supposed to lurk or conceal
himself, are hereby empowered and required to issue proclamation against him reciting his name, if known, and thereby
requiring him forthwith to surrender himself; ... which

proclamation shall be published at the door of the courthouse
of any county in which such fugitive is supposed to lurk or
conceal himself... and if any person against whom the proclamation has been thus issued, continues to stay out, lurk and
conceal himself, any citizen of the State may capture, arrest
and bring him to justice, and in case of flight or resistance
by him, after being called and warned to surrender, may slay
53
him without accusation or impeachment of any crime.
"0 CONNOR, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA

315 (1919); N.C. Sess. Laws

1770,1 ch. 1, 23
" N.C.

LINA
'

2

STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 787 (1904).
Sess. Laws 1764, ch. 7, § 3, 23 STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CARO-

616-17 (1904).

POTTER, ADMINISTRATION AND DUTIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE

OF THE PEACE 443 (2d
"N.C. GEN. STAT.

ed. 1828).
§ 15-48 (1950).
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The statute was possibly reaction to the presence within this
state at the time of a notorious band of outlaws. It is almost inconceivable that such a situation existed less than one hundred years
ago in North Carolina, but below is quoted the introduction to a
history of the individual members of this outlaw clan.
The homely old adage that there is nothing 'new under
the sun' is constantly verified by actual facts occurring every
day. The accounts handed down by tradition of the 'bold
archer Robin Hood' keeping whole counties on the alert, and
disputing the right to kill fat bucks in the royal forest with
the boldest barons, have seemed almost too daring for belief,
yet here we have-in this enlightened period of the world's
history-a whole state of the most powerful and most enlightened nation on earth successfully defied by a band of
less than a dozen Outlaws. Individual hunters essay to track
and capture them, and their bones bleach in the forest paths
for their temerity, troops-regular and irregular-attempt
their subjugation, and are ingloriously repelled by these
dauntless, law-defying bandits.
Not only are they secure in their swampy retreats. They
boldly make raids into the neighboring country, and release
prisoners from the constituted authorities. They fearlessly
enter towns and deliberately carry off the municipal archives
and county treasures.
The most fertile brain ever conjured up such deeds of
courage, cruelly and skillful military stratagems as have
marked the career of undaunted men, in whose veins the
blood of Indian and Negro is strangely commingled. Indeed,
it seems as if the white Frankewstein by his crimes has raised
a fearful monster that will not down at the bidding of his
affrightened master.5 4
These marauders pillaged and roamed throughout Robeson and
surrounding counties in the 1860's and 1870's. State militia, Confederate troops, and an irate citizenry eventually hunted them down
and killed or captured them.
Apparently the North Carolina outlawry is limited to arrest and
apprehension of felons, with constitutional limitations upon sen"4Introduction to
York, ca. 1909).

NORmENT, THE LOWERY HISTORY

(DeWitt ed., New
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tencing without a trial, attainder and corruption of blood or forfeiture.55 The North Carolina statute differs greatly from commonlaw outlawry, the most significant distinction being that a person so
declared cannot be executed or sentenced on the outlawry. The
apparent purpose of the statute is merely to extend the citizen's
power of arrest. It is provided elsewhere that "every person in
whose presence a felony has been committed may arrest the person
whom he knows or has reasonable grounds to believe to be guilty
of such offense.. . ."" But such an arrest is unlawful if no felony
in fact has been committed.T
Not all of North Carolina's outlawry is ancient history. From
time to time it is utilized where notorious or heinous crimes are
involved. One of the most recent and significant outlawries involved
an escapee of Camp Polk prison farm in Wake County in 1960.
Robert Tyson, an inmate of the prison farm, walked away from the
farm on March 24, 1960, shortly before the mutilated body of the
wife of the prison's mess steward was discovered.5" The evidence
pointed unquestionably to Tyson as the perpetrator of the crime.
Tyson ran at large throughout the county for over a week, broke
in homes, raped a woman and a seventeen-year-old girl, and evaded
brazenly all of the law enforcement machinery of the state. The
highway patrol, the National Guard, special deputies, and regular
" "In all criminal prosecutions, every person charged with crime has
the right to be informed of the accusation and to confront the accusers and
witnesses with other testimony." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 9. "No person shall
be put to answer any criminal charges.., but by indictment, presentment,
or impeachment." N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 2. See also N.C. CoNsT. art. I, §
13 (right to trial by jury); N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 29 (recurrence to fundamental principles). The only punishments permitted in North Carolina are
"death, imprisonment with or without hard labor, fines, removal from office,
and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
State." N.C. CONsT. art. II, § 1.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-40 (1950).
5 State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100 (1954).
The interest of
society in the immediate apprehension of criminals is so great that even a
private citizen is given the power of arrest when he has observed the commission of a felony. HALL, THE LAw oF ARREST 86 (2d ed. 1961). The risk
of the arrest is on the citizen. When no felony has in fact been committed
an arresting citizen will be liable in damages for false arrest. Martin v.
Houck, 141 N.C. 317, 54 S.E. 291 (1906). But where the arrestee has been
declared an outlaw, "any citizen. . . may capture, arrest, and bring to justice,
and in case of flight or resistance by him ...may slay him without accusation or impeachment of any crime." Thus, a person can in fact, though not
in law, be executed without a trial. The risk of false arrest is removed and
the use of deadly force justified merely on written affidavit of two Justices
of the Peace.
" Raleigh News and Observer, April 9, 1960, p. 1.
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police posses were unable to contain him. On April 4, 1960, Wake
County superior court Judge George Fountain signed papers declaring Tyson an outlaw.5" Governor Hodges announced the offer
of a reward of four hundred dollars "to any private citizen who
triggers the outlaw's arrest...."60
CONCLUSION

Is there really any need existing today for any state to resort to
outlawry for obedience to its laws? Default judgments and attachments of properties in civil cases, and contempt proceedings in
criminal cases have sufficiently enforced attendance in court to
obviate the barbaric outlawry. When a suspect had fled from the
state's jurisdiction in a criminal case, the constitution, statutes and
treaties provide for extradition."1
"A ready recourse to outlawry is, we are told, one of the tests
by which the relative barbarousness of various bodies of ancient
law may be measured." 62 Such crude administration of justice is
obviated by any number of improvements in law enforcement since
the feudal kings of Bracton's day. The public has at its disposal,
local constables and policemen, sheriffs and their departments, the
highway patrol with statewide jurisdiction, the State and Federal
Bureaus of Investigation, the National Guard, up-to-date communications, and a more civilized and better informed public.
The possibilities of abuse of procedure and the resulting injustice to a victim of such a decree militate strongly against its existence. At common law a very thorough and intricate procedure
was required in order to outlaw a person. One or more writs of
" Id. The decree of outlawry may be found in 55 Wake County Superior
Court Civil Docket 40. Tyson probably never knew he had been declared
an outlaw since the decree issued April 4, 1960, and Tyson had committed
suicide on April 5.
In April 1962 Jack Harvey Davis sawed his way out of a Weldon jail
and was judicially declared an outlaw. Greensboro Daily News, April 26,
1962, p. 6A, col. 1. "Yank" Stewart, leader of the recent mass escape from
Ivy Bluff Prison, has at one time been declared an outlaw. Raleigh News
and Observer, Nov. 4, 1962, § III, p. 1.
"oRaleigh News and Observer, April 7, 1962, p. 1A. Offering of a reward is common among the statutory powers given state governors to encourage diligence on the part of private citizens in assisting in the apprehension of wanted criminals. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-104
(1956).
1
U.S. CosT. art. I, § 11, cl. 2; 4 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROcEnuRE
§ 1633 (12th
ed. 1957). 448.
"22 POLLACK
& MAITLAND
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capias, an exigent, five exactions at five consecutive county courts,
and a proclamation at the door of a place for divine worship were
required before an outlawry could be incurred. North Carolina's
outlawry is less sanguinary, but the procedure is dangerously sim63
ple.
Nothing remains of the social order for which outlawry was
fashioned. A re-evaluation of this archaic statute is recommended
before any irreparable injustice occurs which could reflect upon the
dignity of the laws of North Carolina.
BOBBY G. DEAVER
Pleadings-Material and Immaterial Variance
In Hall v. Poteat1 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently drove his automobile, without lights, from the right shoulder
of the highway into the path of the plaintiff's oncoming automobile.
It was further alleged that this occurred so suddenly that it was
impossible for the plaintiff to avoid a collision. On trial the plaintiff's
testimony tended to show that the defendant's automobile was
stopped, without lights, in the plaintiff's lane of travel when the
collision occurred. No objection to the introduction of this evidence
was made by the defendant. On motion, the trial court granted a
judgment of involuntary nonsuit. On appeal, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, although conceding that the plaintiff's testimony
was sufficient to support a finding of negligence on the part of the
defendant,' held that the variance between the plaintiff's allegations
and proof was material, and thus fatal. Accordingly the judgment of
nonsuit was affirmed.
Variance occurs when the proof does not conform to the case
pleaded. North Carolina, like most code jurisdictions,8 has by
statute set out three degrees of deviation of facts proved from facts
pleaded." As a literal reading of these statutes seems plainly to
"3N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-48 (1950).
'257 N.C. 458, 125 S.E.2d 924 (1962).
2 257 N.C. at 463, 125 S.E.2d at 928.
' See CLARI, CODE PLEADING § 120 (2d ed. 1947).

"The first two degrees are defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168 (1953):
"1. No variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof shall be
deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action upon the merits. Whenever it is alleged that
a party has been so misled, that fact and in what respect he has been misled
must be proved to the satisfaction of the court; and thereupon the judge may
order the pleading to be amended upon such terms as shall be just. 2. Where
the variance is not material as herein provided, the judge may direct the fact
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contemplate, and indeed, as our court consistently construed them'
until the fairly recent past, the overall statutory purpose is to work
increasingly severe consequences, ranging from mere momentary
interruption to nonsuit, upon a plaintiff whose proof varies from
his pleading as the degree of deviation increases. Thus the slightest degree, an immaterial variance, is to be disregarded.' Next,
when a variance is so great as to be prejudicially misleading to the
defendant, it is deemed material and requires an amendment. But
a defendant, in order to avail himself of this remedial action, must
in apt time raise the point and satisfy the trial court that the variance is material under the prejudicially misleading test." If he
fails seasonably to raise the point, he impliedly consents to litigating the issues on the proof offered. The variance, though possibly
"material" under the test, is "deemed immaterial" by the failure of
the defendant in apt time to suggest its prejudicially misleading
to be found according to the evidence, or may order an immediate amendment
without costs." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-169 (1953) defines the third degree:
"Where the allegation of the cause of action or defense to which the proof is
directed is unproved, not in some particular or particulars only, but in its
entire scope and meaning, it is not deemed a case of variance, but a failure of
proof." Thus, there is under this scheme no "fatal" variance.
See Simmons v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 220, 93 S.E. 736
(1917); Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., 169 N.C. 509, 86 S.E. 290
(1915) ; Green v. Biggs, 167 N.C. 417, 83 S.E. 553 (1914) ; Wright v. Insurance Co., 138 N.C. 488, 51 S.E. 55 (1905). For a complete and thorough
discussion of the construction and application of the variance statutes as construed previously see Justice Seawell's dissent inWhichard v.Lipe, 221 N.C.
55, 19 S.E.2d 15 (1942).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168(2) (1953). As an alternative to disregarding
the variance the trial court may order an immediate amendment. Ibid. It
would appear that in deciding whether or not a variance isto be deemed
immaterial the trial judge must ascertain two things. The first iswhether or
not the plaintiff has actually varied from the facts that he has pleaded and
second, ifhe has, isthe variance less than as described as material, i.e., prejudicially misleading under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168(1) (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168(1) (1953). Chief Justice Clark, concurring
in Wright v. Insurance Co., 138 N.C. 488, 495-96, 51 S.E. 55, 58 (1905),
stated that "this section [G.S. § 1-168] further provides that the adverse
party must allege that he was misled, and must prove that fact 'to the satisfaction of the court' and wherein he was misled, and the only penalty and
remedy prescribed isan amendment upon such terms as the court may deem
just. There isno penalty allowed of dismissal of the action or loss of substantial rights by either party. The sole object isthat the cause shall be tried
and decided upon its merits. Here the defendant did not allege that he was
misled .... Had he done so, justice and the statute prescribed as the sole
remedy an amendment upon such terms as the court might deem just. The
court could not visit upon the plaintiff, as a penalty for inadvertence in
pleading, or a mistaken allegation of fact (if made) a dismissal of the action."
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quality to the court.' If the point is raised and it is decided that
the variance is material the court is obligated to protect the defendant from this heretofore unexpected offer of proof by granting a
continuance so that he may adequately prepare to counter it.9 Thus,
a material variance under the statutory scheme is not such a drastic
failure of proof as to justify nonsuit, this final penalty being reserved for the ultimate degree of deviation, which is denominated a
"total failure of proof."' 0 The obvious occasion for applying this
last label and imposing this penalty occurs when the plaintiff attempts to prove a cause of action entirely different from that which
was alleged."
That adherence to any scheme involving such conceptually
elusive gradations will present difficult problems 2 of analysis from
8 E.g.,

Simmons v. John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174 N.C. 220, 93 S.E.

736 (1917). It follows also that once the point is raised on trial the trial
judge's finding that the variance is immaterial is binding unless there is an
abuse of discretion. See Dellinger v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 160 N.C. 532, 76
S.E. 494 (1912), where a variance was deemed immaterial, the supreme
court resting part of its decision on the fact that the trial judge had deemed
it such on objection by the defendant.
'Where there has been some change made in the nature of the action by
an amendment adding new allegations and such change materially affects
the rights of the adverse party, he is entitled to a continuance as a matter of
right. Nassaney v. Culler, 224 N.C. 323, 30 S.E.2d 226 (1944).
°N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-169 (1953).
"' Smith v. Cook, 196 N.C. 558, 146 S.E. 229 (1929); Talley v. Harriss
Granite Quarries Co., 174 N.C. 445, 93 S.E. 995 (1917); Hunt v. Vanderbilt,
115 N.C. 559, 20 S.E. 168 (1894). Adherence to this statutory pattern obviously requires recognition of a degree of variance lying between the merely
immaterial and the total failure of proof which constitute the extremes of
the scheme of deviation. Since this intermediate stage necessarily contemplates some substantial degree of deviation, this deviation must occur with
respect to factual detail within the various "ultimate facts" making up a
particular cause of action. "Total failure of proof" must then mean a failure
to introduce any evidence more than a scintilla in respect of any particular
essential element in the cause of action, rather than a mere variance from
"evidentiary" fact pleaded in specifying facts presumably beyond the actual
requirements of the pleading. This is borne out by the fact that the court
has held a "total failure of proof" not only to occur when the plaintiff proves
or attempts to prove a different cause of action, cases cited supra, but also
when the plaintiff fails to produce enough evidence to substantiate that which
he has pleaded. See, e.g., McCoy v. Railroad, 142 N.C. 383, 55 S.E. 270
(1906). Justice Seawell made such a conceptual analysis, stating that "it
has been considered as axiomatic that a difference between the allegations of
a complaint and the evidence adduced to support them does not constitute a
material variance unless there is a substantial departure in the evidence
from the issues upon which the cause of action depends." Whichard v. Lipe,
221 N.C. 53, 56, 19 S.E.2d 14, 16 (1942) (dissent).
" These problems, though, are no more difficult than those closely related ones constantly faced in determining whether the plaintiff has suc-
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case to case is obvious, but the scheme seems plain. Furthermore,
it makes sense in terms of trial convenience. It contemplates that
a defendant must signify such discomfiture as he may feel from
unexpected proof immediately as he feels it. This is certainly no
particular hardship, and it allows the trial court to make an immediate appraisal of the probable extent of the defendant's inability
by virtue of surprise to counter the offered proof. This is presumably to be done on the basis of a practical appraisal of the
extent to which any investigation of facts reasonably prompted by
the "ultimate facts" pleaded would necessarily have prepared him
to counter the evidence now offered. Thus the notice-giving function of pleadings can adequately be policed at a stage of trial and
under conditions which protect both parties against unjustifiable
results in terms of the ultimate merits of the case. If the case he
has attempted to prove is within reasonable limits, the plaintiff is
protected against a dismissal. The defendant, on the other hand,
by having the right to a continuance is given adequate opportunity
to prepare to meet the now questioned proof. Thus the ultimate
result is that under this scheme a case may fairly be tried on its
merits in one action. 3
As indicated, our court for many years consistently maintained
the integrity of this statutory scheme. 4 But with Whichard v.
Lipe'3 decided in 1942, the court, by reversing a judgment for the
plaintiff on the basis of a "material variance" although there had
ceeded in alleging a cause of action and deciding whether facts pleaded are
"ultimate," "evidentiary," or "conclusions of law."
"SAs stated by Justice Seawell, dissenting in Whichard v. Lipe, 221
N.C. 53, 58, 19 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1942), "the purpose of our own and similar
statutes is to prevent cases from being thrown out of court upon the technicalities so favored by the common law and to enable courts of justice,
when once their jurisdiction has attached, to reach their objectives without
frustration and without the added expense and vexation of being compelled
to march out of court and back again upon a matter not vital or determinative of the controversy." See also note 7 supra quoting from Wright v.
Insurance Co., 138 N.C. 489, 51 S.E. 55 (1905).
' See notes 5-8 & 11 supra. In the earlier cases there appears to have
been only one case that definitely failed to adhere to the statutory scheme.
See Abernathy v. Seagle, 98 N.C. 553, 4 S.E. 542 (1887).
-5221 N.C. 53, 19 S.E.2d 14 (1942). The action was brought against
the owner of a truck alleging liability in tort under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In her complaint the plaintiff alleged the identity of the
driver. On trial she failed to prove his identity, introducing instead evidence tending to show that some agent was driving the truck. The defendant failed to object to the presentation of this evidence. Motion to nonsuit
was denied, and a judgment was rendered for plaintiff. On appeal the
Supreme Court reversed on the grounds of a "material variance."
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been no objection during trial by the defendant to the evidence
presented, introduced a new approach of which the instant case is
the most recent example. Despite Justice Seawell's dissent pointing out the drastic nature of the departure and the virtues of the
scheme abandoned,' 6 the court has used this decision as precedent
in a new line of cases' 7 which in effect equates that degree of variance which formerly could be deemed "material" only if properly
objected to by the defendant during trial, with that which had
previously been considered a "total failure of proof." The result
is that any variance that is found to be "material," is flatly dubbed
"fatal,"" with the consequence that a defendant need no longer
" 221 N.C. 55, 19 S.E.2d 15. It is also interesting to note that Justice
Seawell, after describing the statutory variance scheme and its application,
stated that even with all that he had said previously "there are many cases
in the books which, under our modern liberal practice, lead to the conclusion
that the variance here is immaterial." 221 N.C. at 58, 19 S.E.2d at 17. With
this statement as a starting point a study of the cases that have followed
indicates that this decision not only changed the court's attitude as to the
consequences of "material variance" but also restricted its view as to the
nature of immaterial variances. Compare Dellinger v. Charlotte Elec. Ry.,
160 N.C. 532, 76 S.E. 494 (1912), and Wright v. Insurance Co., 138 N.C.
488, 51 S.E. 55 (1905), with Lucas v. White, 248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387
(1958) and Messick v. Turnage, 240 N.C. 625, 83 S.E.2d 654 (1954).
There are decisions seemingly applying a liberal view of immaterial variance, e.g., Rick v. Murphey, 251 N.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 815 (1959), but
looking at the cases in their sum total many decisions have been appealed
since Whichard that previously would not have been considered by defendants' attorneys as giving grounds for hope that the court would find "material variance." Thus what realistically is no variance at all is sometimes
spoken of as being an immaterial variance. See, e.g., Krider v. Martelle,
252 N.C. 474, 113 S.E.2d 924 (1960). It is also interesting to note that
terms such as "proof without allegation is as unavailing as allegation without proof" and "the plaintiff must make out his case secunduio allegata"
which now abound in the new line of decisions, cases cited note 17 infra and
which form a basis for nonsuit on the grounds of a "material variance," e.g.,
Messick v. Turnage, supra, were formerly used only when the deviation
amounted to a total failure of proof. E.g., McCoy v. Railroad, 142 N.C.
383, 55 S.E. 270 (1906).
"'Vickers v. Russell, 253 N.C. 394, 117 S.E.2d 45 (1960); Moore v.
Singleton, 249 N.C. 287, 106 S.E.2d 214 (1958); Lucas v. White, 248 N.C.
38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1958); Wilkes Poultry Co. v. Clark Trailer & Equip.
Co., 247 N.C. 570, 101 S.E.2d 458 (1958); Andrews v. Bruton, 242 N.C.
93, 86 S.E.2d 786 (1955); Brady v. Nehi Beverage Co., 242 N.C, 32, 86
S.E.2d 901 (1955); Messick v. Turnage, 240 N.C. 625, 83 S.E.2d 654
(1954); Wilkins v. Commerce Fin. Co., 237 N.C. 396, 75 S.E.2d 118
(1953) ; Smith v. Barnes, 236 N.C. 176, 72 S.E.2d 216 (1952) ; Bowen v.
Darden, 233 N.C. 443, 64 S.E.2d 285 (1951); Suggs v. Braxton, 227 N.C.
50, 40 S.E.2d 470 (1946).
"A fatal variance between allegation and proof usually results in a dismissal of the proceedings, as this amounts to a total failure of proof on the
declaration of the cause alleged. Stafford v. Yale, 228 N.C. 220, 222, 44
S.E.2d 872, 873 (1947). (Emphasis added.) A material variance is "fatal."
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suggest seasonably to the trial court that he has been misled to his
prejudice by the plaintiff's offer of proof. Now he can with impunity fail to note any surprise felt, fail to object to the evidence,
and take advantage of the discovered "material variance" by motion
for nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff's case. With few exceptions"9 this approach is now well settled in our decisions.
As a result there is now understandably a premium placed on
prolixity of pleadings and on undue pleading of various alternative
evidentiary factual theories2" as plaintiffs seek to protect themselves
against the exigencies of trial developments which may find them
nonsuited on the basis of a fairly minor deviation of exact fact
proved from exact fact pleaded.21 Furthermore, since a nonsuited
E.g., Hall v. Poteat, 257 N.C. 458, 461, 125 S.E.2d 924, 927 (1962). Thus,
in the earlier cases following Whichard the court felt some qualms about
placing a "material variance" in the same category as a "total failure of
proof." Although the result is now the same, the distinction in labels has
now at last been abandoned.
" Zager v. Setzer, 242 N.C. 493, 88 S.E.2d 94 (1955) ; Spivey v. Newman, 232 N.C. 281, 59 S.E.2d 844 (1950). Both of these cases at first
reading appear to reiterate the rule prior to Whichard but are easily distinguishable on the basis that the supreme court decides that in both of
these cases there was not a "material variance" because it did not find that
the defendant was materially prejudiced. Thus the court on its own now
decides whether or not there was a "material variance." Under the old rule
the burden was placed on the defendant to show by objection that he was
being prejudiced by the introduction of certain evidence. See notes 7 & 8
and accompanying text. See also Chappell v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129
S.E.2d 101 (1963); Martin Flying Service, Inc. v. Martin, 233 N.C. 17, 62
S.E.2d 528 (1958).
2As demonstrated by the principal case a mistake in pleading a small
evidentiary fact can lead to the dire consequence of a material variance.
Thus the attorney, attempting to plead a cause of action grounded on negligence, for example, is placed in difficult straits; especially if he is not certain
of all the details of his client's case. There appear two alternatives. The
first is to plead "ultimate facts" thus leaving a greater leeway for acceptable
deviation. Although this technique was used successfully in at least one
case, Rick v. Murphey, 251 N.C. 162, 110 S.E.2d 815 (1959), the pleader
risks the more than likely prospect of having his complaint demurred to
successfully either prior to trial or ore tenus in the Supreme Court since
the court is stringent in requiring the pleader to allege in his complaint with
great particularity the acts or omissions giving rise to the cause of action.
E.g., Tysinger v. Coble Dairy Prod., 225 N.C. 717, 36 S.E.2d 246 (1945).
Thus, choosing the lesser of two evils the cautious pleader should choose to
plead with prolixity, alleging all that did or could have happened. By following this procedure the plaintiff is safe for "it is sufficient to impose liability to establish any one of the negligent acts enumerated in the complaint
which proximately results in the damage charged." Krider v. Martello,
252 N.C. 474, 475, 113 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
" As noted previously the negligence action gives rise to the greatest
difficulties for the unwary pleader. Perfect examples of the great restrictions
placed upon the pleader are supplied by the cases arising out of automobile
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plaintiff may always commence again, 2 the nonsuit actually accomplishes nothing in terms of remedying the immediate problem
of variance that a continuance under the law as formerly applied
would not do. It merely adds further expense since the plaintiff
now has to commence a new action rather than simply seeing that
the case is put back on the trial calendar after the time allowed
defendant in the continuance order has expired.
For the foregoing reasons it would appear that the pre-Whichard application of our statutory variance scheme was much preferable to that which is presently applied. Reappraisal by the court
to reinstate authority of the earlier line of cases would seem to be
in order. Another possibility would be for the General Assembly
to enact a "litigation by consent" type of statute which, avoiding
outright the troublesome variance conceptions, would approach the
problem in head-on fashion.23
GEORGE C. COCHRAN

collisions. The principle case does not stand alone in finding a "material
variance" for slight variations of fact proved from fact pleaded. In Lucas
v. White, 248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1955) the plaintiff alleged that prior

to the collision between his automobile and that of the defendant's, the defendant's car was "wobbling." On trial the evidence showed that the defendant's car proceeded in a straight line to the point of impact. The court held
that this was a "material variance." See also Brady v. Nehi Beverage Co.,
242 N.C. 32, 86 S.E.2d 901 (1955). The ultimate in granting a nonsuit on
the basis of failure of the plaintiff to prove exactly that which he had alleged
is Messick v. Turnage, 240 N.C. 625, 83 S.E.2d 654 (1954). In that case the
plaintiff sued for injuries arising when plaster fell from the ceiling of the
defendant's theatre. A nonsuit was affirmed by the supreme court when it
was found that the falling plaster was due to a leaking bathroom rather
than from rainwater seeping through the roof as alleged.
.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-25 (1953) reads in part: "If an action is com-

menced within the time prescribed therefore, and the plaintiff is nonsuited...

the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year after such

nonsuit...."

. "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they
had been raised in the pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).

